Thursday, May 29, 2008

A Long Definition of Property, and Ownership

Apparently, the concept of ownership isn't clear, so I'm going to lay it out again.

I'm not surprised it's not clear - there are many incentives to deliberately confuse yourself about property rights. Anything less than a full and ironclad definition will be challenged. Indeed even the ironclad definition will be challenged, but not coherently.


Let's begin.

You control yourself. Actually, whatever controls your body is you.

It works like this. Your arms can wave about. Something controls that waving. That thing also controls your mind and vocal cords, which means that the only thing we can interact with (at least with current tech) is your body's controller.

This is typically what we mean when we say 'you' - it is the thing that controls your body. So, you control yourself, and this is incontrovertible.

There are two parts to the next argument. First, that property rights are inevitable. Second, once they exist, property rights can't be contravened by anyone without logical contradiction. My apologies for the clunky wording. The underlying concepts are much more elegant; I simply haven't found the good, simple, straightforward way to express them.

Aliens will have property rights. All finite living beings (all life has goals, all things that can be assigned goals are living) need to control their environment, or they perish. They need to be able to achieve their goals, or they become non-living. This control is an extension of self-control.

As a result, all life will expect to be able to control their environment. If they did not, they would not waste the energy to try - and they would perish, unable to reach or even strive for goals. Conversely, if they did try but could not expect to control their environment, they would run out of energy and perish. This expectation of control is inevitable for anything that lives.

Because I am a living thing I expect that I can control my environment.

Because you are also a living thing, the situation is symmetrical. Especially since we are, for all intents and purposes, the identical type of thing - human. (Some tiny differences with gender or birth defects I am ignoring for the moment.)

We call this fact ownership - the control of something leads directly from the expectation of control, which is ownership, and vice-versa; ownership leads from control. We cannot both reasonably expect to control a single thing at the same time. (Without fusing our mind/controller so that we are a single entity.)

Since control inevitably implies ownership, I have ownership of my body. I can claim ownership of the environment by exerting my bodily control to control my environment. Having done so, if a person attempts violence, such as theft, upon my property, they also expect to own this part of the environment. However, logically, this is impossible.

I own, for instance, my wallet because I reasonably expect to control it. If a thief also reasonably expects to control it, the thief also owns it. (Assume the theft will be successful, as the thief must, or they would not attempt the theft.) We both own the wallet. This is immediately contradictory; but we cannot both control the wallet, and we cannot both reasonably expect to control the wallet. As a result, if the thief can reasonably expect to control the wallet, nobody owns the wallet. Which means the thief doesn't own the wallet. Which means they don't expect to own it. Which means they're not going to be a thief, and we see the contradiction again; to violate property rights leads to logical contradictions. To attempt theft is to violate the very reasons you are attempting theft. Theft is inherently hypocritical.

Again, if we did not expect to control something - if ownership or property does not exist - then we would not try to control it at all.

Indeed, all immoral behavior is, as I can verify, hypocritical. All evil is hypocritical; hypocrisy is the only evil. I can verify it not just logically, but empirically; nearly everything called immoral is hypocritical in this way.

Again:
  1. You must be able to reasonably expect to control your environment (as all living things must, but this is irrelevant - you must, this is a fact.)
  2. Two agents cannot both control one object at a single time.
  3. Only one agent can reasonably expect to control one object at a single time.
  4. We call this ownership.
  5. If a second agent attempts to violate (they must use violence) the ownership of a first agent, the second agent must reasonably expect to control the object.
  6. Theft (less obviously, all violence) requires that two entities own an object at one time.
  7. Theft is logically contradictory, by (2.)
  8. You cannot commit theft without hypocrisy - without contradicting a concept you are using in your reasons for theft.
And we can see this easily, once we realize that ownership is reasonable expectation of control. As soon as a thief decides that they are stealing my wallet, the ownership of the wallet would have to change. But, if ownership is to be meaningful, I would have to somehow be able to test for this change in ownership so that I would stop reasonably expecting to control it, which I cannot do.

So, as I've heard before, someone will say, though with less sophistication and clarity, "But that only means that ownership is simply an invalid concept!" This cannot be the case; a reasonable expectation of control is necessary for you to even to type out the objection. You must own your body, your keyboard, and rent the internet, at least long enough for it to get to me.

Again, if you did not reasonably expect to control your keyboard (you didn't own it) you wouldn't try to type, and I would never get your message.

(Renting: A time-delimited agreement of reasonable expectation of control, usually with physical limitations placed by the previous/subsequent owner, also usually with various clauses that immediately transfer back the reasonable expectation of control if the physical limitations are violated. Essentially borrowing for money - the real owner agrees to exerts their right to not control the borrowed object as long as you keep exerting your right to hand over the cash.)


There was at least one benefit to me from being challenged. I thought that ownership inevitably implied control, which is only almost true. Indeed, if you are not mistaken, ownership and control are always the same. However, because ownership is only a subjective expectation of control, not actual control itself, in physical terms they don't always coincide. Also, typing that last sentence inspired a whole new post on subjectivity, which I'll complete in the hazy future.

To conclude, we see again that there is but a short hop from property rights to universal ethics.

51 comments:

kage said...

:: Two agents cannot both control one object at a single time.

they cannot control it *differently* - if we are cooperators, then we can both have control/ownership over materials without contradicting ourselves or one another. i think this is a basic mistake underpinning property theory - the assumption that all agents have contradictory goals. the commonality of human ends undermines the need for property law (to the extent that it exists).

:: Theft ... requires that two entities own an object at one time.

what? theft requires that one takes control over material that another had previously controlled. there is no contradiction -

Anonymous said...

Oh dear. So much ignorance, so litle time.
This isn't a definition of anything - it's an assertion of ideology.

Title property (its full name) is a relatively recent invention. It emerged in the 17th/18th century as a direct result of the Enclosure movement (a process whereby powerful people 'stole' common land).

It became necessary to prevent others doing to them, what they had done to commoners - and 'title' was the answer. In simple terms, they were regularising the proceeds of theft.

Not surprisingly, this invention became hugely popular in the AMericas, where the colonists were in the process of 'stealing' a continent.

Title property can be useful tool - it encourages efforts to increase value, and gives some protection to the physically weak, but it's plain dumb to elevate it to an ideology.

Alrenous said...

they cannot control it *differently* - if we are cooperators, then we can both have control/ownership over materials without contradicting ourselves or one another.

But it doesn't mean anything. Sure, if six people want an object to do the same thing, they can.

The problem is that it's meaningless, because as soon as there is a conflict, the real controller will emerge.

Six people cannot all eat the same apple.

The car goes where the drivers tells it to go, regardless of whether the passengers agree.

Does the fact that you don't refuse to be taxed - despite the fact you have no choice - make it voluntary?

what? theft requires that one takes control over material that another had previously controlled. there is no contradiction

Yes, I figured many would miss the fact that I've precisely defined ownership. Reasonable expectation of control, dude.

Oh dear. So much ignorance, so litle time.

So much condescension, so little care.

Hey, I've got a plan. If I'm so wrong, my logic must have a flaw. Why don't you point it out instead of trying to educate me about history?

You even use the concept of theft, (from the commoners) thereby only vindicating me - the powerful and the commoners cannot both control land at the same time.

Le sigh.

Peter said...

"all life has goals, all things that can be assigned goals are living"

Plants, fungi, bacteria? Maybe you mean 'sentience' or some such thing other than 'life'.

They need to be able to achieve their goals, or they become non-living."

That's true, if you're defining a goal as 'what is needed to stay alive', or saying that 'staying alive, not dying' is a goal. But then your argument approaches tautology status.

Otherwise, do I become non-living when I fail to complete college, or my marriage fails, etc.?

We cannot both reasonably expect to control a single thing at the same time.

Joint ownership cannot exist then? If my brother and I have equal stakes in a restaurant, which of us owns it? Or is it the manager's property, because he essentially 'controls' it, even though it is my brother and I who 'own' it in the financial sense?

"I own, for instance, my wallet because I reasonably expect to control it. If a thief also reasonably expects to control it, the thief also owns it [...]"

What if I lose my wallet? I lose then both the expectation of control (plenty of things we lose never come back to us, and we can't expect to control something that is lost), and the actual control of it. I have no "reasonable expectation of control" over it. I no longer own it.

If someone finds it, and forms a reasonable expectation of control over it, are they now the owners of the wallet? There's no logical contradiction, because I don't own it anymore. At best, I am the wallet's "previous owner".

Not that this is necessarily something that disproves your theory, but it's an interesting implication.

"Indeed, all immoral behavior is, as we can verify, hypocritical."

Very Kantian. I like it.

The distinction between "owning" and "renting" needs some work.

Also, and this may be related, what would you consider to be the difference between "ownership" and "possession"?

Alrenous said...

Peter;

Plants, fungi, bacteria? Maybe you mean 'sentience' or some such thing other than 'life'.

Yes. If you attempt to kill a bacteria with, for instance, bleach, it will react in an attempt to save its life. It can be assigned the goal of preserving the integrity of the cell membrane.

If it did not, it would be like a rock; the rock never reacts to a sledgehammer.

But then your argument approaches tautology status.


Hopefully the above explanation shows how this is not the case.

Joint ownership cannot exist then? If my brother and I have equal stakes in a restaurant, which of us owns it?

You each own half of it.

Or is it the manager's property, because he essentially 'controls' it

The true owners - you and your brother - have agreed to not exercise your control, in favor of the manager. If there is a conflict between you and the manager, who will win? If the manager decides to fire everybody and turn it into a coffee shop, what happens?

What if I lose my wallet?

If someone finds it, and forms a reasonable expectation of control over it, are they now the owners of the wallet?

Not that this is necessarily something that disproves your theory, but it's an interesting implication.


Indeed. I rather like these implications, personally.

The distinction between "owning" and "renting" needs some work.

I'll think about it then.

Also, and this may be related, what would you consider to be the difference between "ownership" and "possession"?

Immediately from this theory, there is no difference. Perhaps I might want to define possession such that the lost wallet should find its way to the previous owner. Then I would hope to find a logical extension to justify such a definition.

Specifically, defining possession to describe proscribed as opposed to legitimate ownership. (Technically, a thief, after the theft, owns the wallet, but got it through act that defies the concept of ownership.)

James Andrix said...

Specifically, defining possession to describe proscribed as opposed to legitimate ownership. (Technically, a thief, after the theft, owns the wallet, but got it through act that defies the concept of ownership.)
but defying the concept of ownership in no way invalidates that ownership, because not-defying-ownership is not part of your requirements.

Your flaw is in 6:
Theft (less obviously, all violence) requires that two entities own an object at one time.
A simple picture of theft is you controlling your wallet, and then me controlling your wallet. To show that we both 'own' it at the same time (Violating (2)) you would need to explain how your ownership 'sticks' to the object after you set it down.

Your definition of control is imprecise, which makes your definition of ownership imprecise. For example, if I'm standing next to you, I'm heating your wallet with infrared radiation. Right now as I type this, I'm exerting a gravitational tug on it. if I knew where you were, I could even predictably modify the strength of the tug.

Your control is not absolute, and will leave all kinds of logical holes in your argument. If you try to patch the holes, you will have a system of property that assert that no one has the right to have any influence on your property without your consent. This line of argument becomes absurd and useless.

Alrenous said...

A simple picture of theft is you controlling your wallet, and then me controlling your wallet. To show that we both 'own' it at the same time (Violating (2)) you would need to explain how your ownership 'sticks' to the object after you set it down.

I redefined ownership more precisely. The thief and the victim both reasonably expect to control the wallet at the same time. They cannot both be right.

Your definition of control is imprecise, which makes your definition of ownership imprecise.

I am glad that you pointed this out, because now I can say why not. You are influencing my possessions but you are not in any way interfering with my goals, which is what I use my control for.

If I had a lawn and you killed some of it by leaving a large pile of gold on it, technically that's vandalism but you aren't actually contradicting my goals, so I let it slide.

If you try to patch the holes, you will have a system of property that assert that no one has the right to have any influence on your property without your consent.

I admit defeat. Oh wait! No I don't.

This line of argument becomes absurd and useless.

If it's useless, presumably then there's no value in it. So why are you commenting? What do you hope to salvage here?

James Andrix said...

I redefined ownership more precisely. The thief and the victim both reasonably expect to control the wallet at the same time. They cannot both be right.

If someone makes an argument and one of the premises is wrong, and their conclusion is wrong, then they are the one that is not right.

How do you mean 'reasonable'? Yes it's reasonable that I control my wallet if it is in fact in my pocket. But if it is in fact not in my pocket, but in your, then my expectation is not reasonable, because one of the premises of my conclusion is false. My confusion about reality is not 'reasonable'.

More over, if, I set down an object, why is it still reasonable for me to expect to control it? Why does the ownership stick?

You are influencing my possessions but you are not in any way interfering with my goals, which is what I use my control for.

But you decide what your goals are. It doesn't test your model of ownership very well if you just happen to have goals that don't stress it.

I decide what my goals are. If you interact with my wallet in a way that interferes with my goals (stealing it, shooting it with a laser, demagnetizing my credit cards, reading my credit card numbers) What is my remedy?

(notice too, that the last item is actually getting sensitive information from my property, this is my property influencing you.)

My goals involve carefully organizing the atoms of my wallet. Your gravitational tug is influencing my property and interfering with my goals. What is my remedy?

Clearly now my goals or expectations have become unreasonable, but where do you draw the line?

If it's useless, presumably then there's no value in it. So why are you commenting? What do you hope to salvage here?

You.

Alrenous said...

"What do you hope to salvage here?"

"You."


How charitable of you. You're aware this is likely to take months of persistence, yes? These kinds of salvage operations take a great deal of commitment from both sides.

Notably, I know this because I've done it twice in the past few years. Once on Stefan Molyneux and once on Mencius Moldbug. Actually, more than twice, come to think, but not from online sources.

When I started, I was only atypical in that I could think in straight lines and that I knew public schools are horrific.

How do you mean 'reasonable'?

Reasonable, unfortunately, is not well-defined, but rather a 'you know what I mean.' Fortunately, this vagueness is not material to my derivation.

But if it is in fact not in my pocket, but in yours, then my expectation is not reasonable, because one of the premises of my conclusion is false. My confusion about reality is not 'reasonable'.

It's reasonable for the wallet-holder because they have no reason to believe otherwise. If the thief is skilled, they will in fact gain control of the wallet, and thus its reasonable for them as well. From the thief's perspective this is the exact chain of reasoning that leads a miner or farmer to reasonably expect to control the rocks or plants they dig up.

More over, if, I set down an object, why is it still reasonable for me to expect to control it? Why does the ownership stick?

When it's reasonable. If you set your wallet down on a rock and walk away, it's not reasonable to expect it to be there when you get back.

However, if you chain and lock your wallet to a large rock and walk away, it is reasonable to expect it to be there when you get back, though this is partially delving into a side issue. Our society, as I predict, enhances our wealth by expanding ownership - the number of situations that reasonably lead to an expectation of control. If in Canada you chain something to the ground, it sends a message that you expect it to be there, and so you can reasonably expect passersby to know that cutting the chain is theft.

But you decide what your goals are. Etc...

First, you can't reasonably expect to precisely arrange the atoms in your wallet. My involuntary gravitational waves are irrelevant to this impossibility.

Second, looking at actual examples, comparing my formulation to the current one, we find that it fits. Everything I currently legally 'own' I also own in the precise sense. This is of course not a logical proof, so onto third...

Third, I have to admit that I'm glad you brought this up, because I have to think about it to get the actual answer.

Fourth, there is a non-arbitrary cutoff, supplied by the basic concept; self-ownership. As our spheres of ownership expand, eventually they meet. At this point, if I change your goals such that things you previously owned are affected, then I put yourself in the same position as the thief; I am a hypocrite.

The only attack to this argument is to say our goals always conflict. This clearly is not true. There is at least one situation where our goals do not conflict. Thus, starting from that situation, you cannot change your goals such that they conflict with others'.

The basic attack to this further argument is simply a counterexample, which would prove that I've somehow contradicted myself or have a hidden assumption. It would then be my responsibility to find it.

James Andrix said...

So the thief has a correct view of reality, and the owner has an incorrect view, but when you jump on the logical contradiction, it's the thief fault?

If you're going to carry the consistency requirement over all premises by all agents in a scenario, and you get an inconsistency, shouldn't you trace it back to a false premise? You shouldn't just stop at the premise you want to label hypocrisy.




However, if you chain and lock your wallet to a large rock and walk away, it is reasonable to expect it to be there when you get back,

This seems to be based on maintaining control indirectly, not on maintaining ownership when that control is absent.

If I can only own something when I physically secure it, then it becomes might makes right.

If I saw lump of gold chained to a rock, I would try to cut the chain. Given a fair amount of time, I could come back with cutters. This is entirely reasonable. People have expended far more effort to get gold up from under many tons of rock. This was once unowned gold.

If it is the chain that communicates that this 'is under the control' of someone, then the argument has become that 'it is owned, because there is reasonable expectation of control, because it's unreasonable to cut the chain, because the gold is owned.'

Interestingly, this is a situation in which you have weak and indirect control, and I have direct and near complete control, yet you still 'own' it. This is the opposite of the situation with my gravity wave detector and camera.


First, you can't reasonably expect to precisely arrange the atoms in your wallet. My involuntary gravitational waves are irrelevant to this impossibility.

Perhaps I can't, but I probably could try to precisely control a few atoms I owned, inside my gravity wave detector.

If my property can detect you, then are interfering with it in perhaps significant ways.

If I try to take a picture and you're out there reflecting photons, then you're interfering in the internal working of my camera. (and ruining my shot!)

At this point, if I change your goals such that things you previously owned are affected, then I put yourself in the same position as the thief; I am a hypocrite.

I do not understand that sentence.

Thus, starting from that situation, you cannot change your goals such that they conflict with others'.

Wait, "cannot" or "if you do it will be like stealing"?

And doesn't that seem a little extreme?

Alrenous said...

So the thief has a correct view of reality, and the owner has an incorrect view, but when you jump on the logical contradiction, it's the thief fault?

If you're going to carry the consistency requirement over all premises by all agents in a scenario, and you get an inconsistency, shouldn't you trace it back to a false premise? You shouldn't just stop at the premise you want to label hypocrisy.


This passage is ambiguous. Since I am a flawed human being, I assume the stupid option. Therefore, I shouldn't assume.

I would ask you to clarify what exact issue you have. You seem to have at least two and a half. I suggest you state them separately, though of course you may have a better plan.

Just for clarity, my assumption would be that you're deliberately avoiding the issue of 'reasonableness.' Since you're not arguing directly against the idea, however, this assumption would seem flawed. So, clarification.

I do not understand that sentence.

Then I will ask explicitly: Would you prefer brevity, or clarity? I like to state things in two different ways and supply an example. I hold myself back because I don't like to waste people's time, nor to add large chunks of probably superfluous text.

I do, apparently, like to type like a pretentious bastard, though. Loquaciousness ftw!

Anyway...

There is some situation wherein our goals do not conflict. Say we both live by gathering on opposite sides of the world. (This is simply for logical clarity, I don't think our goals have actually ever conflicted; we can start anytime.)* Assume some alien comes and builds things around us, very Civ or RTS style, to kickstart self-directed expansion.

*(I don't count your goal for me to believe something else, because this is a means, not an end. It's terribly likely that your actual end does not conflict with my goals, and we simply differ on what we reasonably see as efficient means. Since this is a difference of data, and neither of us hate truth, this nontrivially means that, basically, that word 'goal' at the beginning of this parenthesis does not refer to the actual concept 'goal,' and thus we have no conflicting goals.)

Eventually, our goals, for example which of us gets to build a shiny new nano-factory on the Cape of Good Hope, will conflict. But this is not precise enough. Eventually, our goals will meet, such that I cannot form a new goal without having to harm your existing goals.

In essence, the theory of property is the theory that decides what happens at this point. I contend that for me to harm your goals leads to a contradiction, because these goals all depend on the reasonable expectation of control.

As we build and expand, eventually our goals will conflict.

(This is what moderately verbose Alrenous looks like. I could get more verbose, if necessary.)

Wait, "cannot" or "if you do it will be like stealing"?

Ahem.

You cannot logically change your goals, goals taken such that you cannot hold a goal without attempting to carry it out, (that would be just imagining a goal), in such a way as to conflict with the goals of beings that are logically identical (or close enough) to you, without forming a logical contradiction; that is, to hold a belief at odds with your actions, which, because you are human, also follow from your beliefs.

That may be a run on sentence, but it is, in fact, one thought. It would probably be better represented graphically, so I'm going to use my 1337 paintbrush skillz and then link to photobucket.

Regardless, you can see why I use a precis.

I hope, because it's complicated enough already, I don't have to add an analysis of why, even though our data is probabilistic, we cannot make our goals probabilistic. I can if necessary.

I was going to analyze the impossibility of contradiction, but I want to finish responding to your comment.

If I try to take a picture and you're out there reflecting photons, then you're interfering in the internal working of my camera. (and ruining my shot!)

I was trying to take your objections seriously, then you said this.

It suddenly became obvious that I'm not actually arguing with you.

(Yes, I am reading your comment out of order.)

For third parties: This is the kind of crap that leads people to make accusations of mental masturbation. I could argue with him but aside from rejecting it outright, the only method is to slowly show contradictions until we get back near reality.

This is also a good example of two features of logical disorder.

First, this is a clear example of a bad argument impersonating a good argument, as all effective bad arguments do. He's attempting to use reductio ad absurdum, but unfortunately didn't take the time to understand the theory first. His technique is then to confuse appearance with substance in the hopes that I do the same.

Second, note that it's very hard to find a bad argument that does not self contradict. In this case, he has pressed the button on his camera when I'm in the viewfinder, and is now complaining that, because I reflect photons, (NOT, for instance, because I've leaped into the frame at the key moment), I've somehow ruined his shot. Unless I've hypnotized him, he chose where to point the camera and when to take the picture. I cannot reasonably assume his goal was to do anything but to take a picture of me.

In fact, I cannot even reasonably bring up alternatives like hypnotism.

Given a fair amount of time, I could come back with cutters. This is entirely reasonable.

No. I mentioned the social context for a reason. Did you ignore it for a reason?

the argument has become that 'it is owned, because there is reasonable expectation of control, because it's unreasonable to cut the chain, because the gold is owned.'


No, actually.

I would explain, but I already did. I don't see how repeating myself is going to help.

James Andrix said...

The argument:
P
not-P
therefore: inconsistency

is very different from the argument:
A believes P
B believes not-P
therefore: inconsistency

The latter can work, if A and B are perfect logicians. If reality is consistent, then perfect and honest logicians can not disagree. A line of argument that shows disagreement would show that one of them was not being perfect and honest.

When I asked you what you meant by reasonable, you said 'you know what I mean' so I assumed you meant is somewhat loosely and not the conclusion of perfect logicians.

The Argument:
A, B, C, D
A and B imply P
C and D imply not-P
therefore: inconsistency

shows that at least one of A,B,C,D are false. In this form it is not clear which one.

your argument appears to be:
logician A believes P
logician B believes not-P
not-P is true
inconsistency
therefore, agent B is a hypocrite

Or is it that B shouldn't cause P to be false because that would confuse A?

I think the simplest explanation to this logical contradiction is that your definition of property is flawed.

And if 'reasonable' doesn't mean the conclusions of perfect logicians, then there is simply no contradiction. One of them is just wrong.

--
I think talking about entities that are 'logically identical (or close enough)' is either not well defined or meaningless. Clearly two entities can want the same thing to the exclusion of the other. humans, for example are not stamped from a factory with bit-perfect identical goal sets.
--
I was trying to take your objections seriously, then you said this.

As I said, the imprecise definition of control breaks the precision of the rest of your definition. I asked where you draw the line, and got no precise answer.
Of course I am not being fair in getting upset at your interference with my camera, because your loose definition allows it. I want to take a picture of the fountain, and your property (body) is in the way, note that this could be true even before I click the shutter. Your existence in that patch of space/time is affecting my property.
Your assumptions about my intentions is a patch to cover the imprecise definition of control and maintain the conclusion you want. (That your model leads to roughly conventional models of property.)

If you're going to criticize my logic, tell me what you mean by 'reasonable' and 'control'.

In your graphic, you say 'people are not logically different' can you justify or explain that somehow? It seems rather central.

Also 'believes that he should be allowed to reasonably expect to control' is very different than 'reasonably expects to control'. This is a whole other meta-level away from 'control'. If you're going to use this, you should probably lay out new premises that include it.
And define 'allow'.


No. I mentioned the social context for a reason. Did you ignore it for a reason?

Yes, it appears circular.
If the only reason that your expectation of control is 'reasonable' is that you expect I will honor your expectation of control of your wallet and I am myself reasonable, then you are relying on the premise that reasonable person will conclude that the reasonable expectation of control confers ownership. The only reason to conclude that reasonable person will conclude something is if it is true, but that conclusion is what you are setting to prove.

A reasonable thief will say: A expects to control his wallet remotely with a chain, he is incorrect.

Another reasonable person might say: B expects to control all the pixels in his camera, he is incorrect.

Alrenous said...

You know, if I insult you, continuing to communicate yet ignoring the insult is not healthy.

Am I to conclude you found that none of my comments impugn your integrity?

Or shall I conclude that you do not value health?

A believes P
B believes not-P
therefore: inconsistency

The latter can work, if A and B are perfect logicians.


I knew you were thinking this, which is why I drew up the diagram.

B believes P for himself and not-P for others. A doesn't have to come into it.

The problem is that B's apparent logical category 'himself' is arbitrary and cannot support the distinction between P and not-P.

Yes, not being a hypocrite does demand perfect logic. I therefore do not expect everyone to be perfectly free of hypocrisy.

Yes, it appears circular.

Then say so. I mentioned it for a reason, rightly or wrongly. It is, in fact, critical to that particular line of argument. You may believe it's not important but then you need to convince me of same.

I think the simplest explanation to this logical contradiction is that your definition of property is flawed.


Unfortunately the simplest explanation is wrong, as that's not my argument. I'm glad, however, that you've laid your understanding of it out so clearly.

--
I think talking about entities that are 'logically identical (or close enough)' is either not well defined or meaningless. Clearly two entities can want the same thing to the exclusion of the other. humans, for example are not stamped from a factory with bit-perfect identical goal sets.

I did indeed skip this part entirely.

First, let's examine the definition of morality. I'm going to hand-wave the definition of 'right' and 'wrong,' becuase the exact definition is not material in this case.

The purpose of morality is to describe a set of actions that are always right or always wrong, regardless of any other consideration.

If it is moral for a thief to steal, it is always moral. The problem is that 'steal' has been defined by fiat, which leads many people to subjective morality.

I've found that there's no action that is always right, and only one type of action that is always wrong: hypocrisy.

The key then is to show that the thief and victim have properties which lead to logical conclusions that are identical with respect to the proposition of theft.

Humans are, in fact, this similar. (Barring disabilities and such, obviously.) Thus if the thief has one set of rules for themselves and a second for the victim, this difference cannot be supported and is a self-contradiction.

As illustration, further research in this area would discover whether livestock in fact are logically identical or different to humans with respect to murder. I suspect they are different, but as an omnivore, I would, wouldn't I?

We can also see that I've identified the crux of the vegetarian argument. They think livestock lives are logically identical to human lives, while I think they aren't.

We can alo notice also that theives are very fond of the argument, "You're the same as me." This is an unconscious manifestation of their instinctual or intuitive knowledge of the above truths.
--

because your loose definition allows it.

No it doesn't. Yes, the definition of 'reasonable' is probably imprecise. However, the camera is not an edge case.

Your existence in that patch of space/time is affecting my property.

And unless you control something I'm using, such as the ground around the fountain, you cannot order me to move, and there is no reason to believe that I'm going to do anything but show up in your shot if you take it. You cannot reasonably expect to control the shot, and indeed you do not.

If you're going to criticize my logic, tell me what you mean by 'reasonable' and 'control'.

You clearly understand control. Obviously the sticking point is at 'reasonable.' I put this in to rule out insane people. Healthy adults believe things for actual reasons and often have to act as if they have 100% certainty, for instance in the belief/expectation that their house will still be there when they get back to it. Or that their wallet will remain in their pocket. Deliberately violating this expectation is a self-contradiction.

I wonder if you're confusing our particular expansions of property rights with the state of pristine property rights.

In your graphic, you say 'people are not logically different' can you justify or explain that somehow? It seems rather central.

You caught this one already.

Also 'believes that he should be allowed to reasonably expect to control' is very different than 'reasonably expects to control'. This is a whole other meta-level away from 'control'. If you're going to use this, you should probably lay out new premises that include it.
And define 'allow'.


I was begging the question. I did that because I already know the thief's beliefs are wrong.

The thief reasonably expects to control the wallet, or they wouldn't try to take it. To hold this expectation, they have to expect that the wallet-holder cannot expect to control it.

Right I think I see where the problem is.

The conclusion is the same; if the thief thinks that the wallet holder cannot control the wallet, why does the thief think they can control the wallet? The premises need to be modified. This happens because I don't think in English or anything like English and the transliteration is...nontrivial...

Of course, the thief imagines that the wallet-holder reasonably expects to control the wallet, because otherwise theft would be unprofitable. Paranoid wallet-owners trap the wallet or don't bother to bring it, because they expect it to be stolen. This still leads to a contradiction, but slightly differently than I have described.

The thief reasonably expects to control the wallet. The thief knows that the holder reasonably expects to control the wallet. Thus they are, deliberately and a priori, contravening the expectations of the wallet-holder. This idea generalizes to all property rights.

And they are, again a priori, doing something they think is wrong. They are always doing something they would oppose if it happened to them. ("Do not unto others as you would not have them do unto you.")

Technically speaking I don't even need to define morals. It pops out of this analysis.

This actually solves a problem for me. Contradictions are impossible; for instance, it is impossible to implement communism. (Or democracy, for that matter.) No one can implement the contradictory elements simultaneously, which means that an arbitrary set of contradictory elements must be dropped in practice. In other words if the logical structure you first outlined were valid, theft would literally be impossible.

If the only reason that your expectation of control is 'reasonable' is that you expect I will honor your expectation of control of your wallet and I am myself reasonable,

It's a good thing that's not the reason, then!

It's reasonably because I steal your wallet, you can sic the police on me. If I can reasonably expect to resist arrest, they will call in the army, and the army will shoot me.

--
I asked some questions you didn't answer. I'm not trying to pressure you to answer them, but I feel I should let you know that I noticed. My questions are usually trapped such that to refuse to answer, you need to do so explicitly; "I refuse to answer."

James Andrix said...

if the thief thinks that the wallet holder cannot control the wallet, why does the thief think they can control the wallet? The premises need to be modified.

Indeed.

The thief knows better than most that if he does not guard his wallet, it may be stolen. The thief knows there is a thief behind the owner, and the owner does not.

A perfect logician would never conclude he had control of his wallet because he put it in his pocket once, and stopped paying attention.

A 'reasonable' human might, but he would be wrong.

James Andrix said...

It's reasonably because I steal your wallet, you can sic the police on me. If I can reasonably expect to resist arrest, they will call in the army, and the army will shoot me.

Because of course I can reasonably expect to know who cut the chain.

You're reaching further and further to maintain my 'reasonable' control of my wallet. because as soon as I lose control, my 'property rights' fall off.

And why would the police come after you? Because you have a wallet I own? The circularity is still there, it's just a bigger circle.

Alrenous said...

Way to ignore the rest of my post.

I assume, then, that you value cherry-picking.

Thus, I choose to pick no cherries.

Alrenous said...

While my previous comment has all the necessary information, I suddenly realized you're not going to find it. (Probably goes for third parties as well.)

The fact is, James has never been too keen on answering my actual words. Now he's just gone overboard with the non-communication, and until he decides to actually talk to me, I'm not going to deign to further pretend he is.

Do you know why I quote nearly his entire post in my comments?

James Andrix said...

I am trying to cut to the core issues. (the inconsistency in one post, circularity in the other.)

Other issues are ballooning because our conceptions of the core differ. You can't align the leaves of two trees.

This shouldn't have to take months.

If my comments have left out something vital, say so.

Alrenous said...

I am trying to cut to the core issues.

A noble goal. Next time, try not to ignore my rebuttals.

Sorry, that sounds overly sarcastic, but I can't resist.

If my comments have left out something vital, say so.

I did. I guess I need to be more explicit? Which I already asked you about? Are you going to answer me this time? You're welcome not to, I just need a clear signal. I do, in fact, ask my questions for a reason. At least pretend to respect the fact that I think they're important.
--

The core issue is that the wallet holder *can* reasonably assume that the wallet will stay in his pocket, because otherwise they wouldn't have put it there.

If theft can be justified, there will be nothing to steal. This is the first core issue. Thus, (nontrivially) theft is always unjustified.

(In fact, it may be helpful for us to follow not the actual logical proof, but the path I took to get to it? What do you think?)

The second core issue is how this relates to self-ownership.

Violating 'other's self ownership' is not a valid concept, as the logical consequences of the definition of 'other' are identical, with respect to theft, as the definition of 'self.'

Because valid property rights are based on self-ownership and the exercising thereof through reasonable expectation of control of the outside world, theft also violates self-ownership and is thus always hypocritical - the thief always believes that theft is wrong.

Unfortunately, these issues cannot be considered separately. Any analysis of one will birth the other.
--

Wrenching core beliefs around always takes months, if not years. These ideas are not idle masturbation on my part.

If this weren't true, psychologists wouldn't have appointments. They would just open stalls and first-come, first-served. A few hours and bingo! Instant life changing event!

James Andrix said...

Your rebuttals?

As I look at it, I have an overwhelming upper hand at this point. but like I said, it's the core that matters.

I guess I need to be more explicit? Which I already asked you about? Are you going to answer me this time?

Yes.Yes. Yes. ;-)

I'd like you to restate your argument with the terminology you're using now, as it seems different than what you used before.

--
The core issue is that the wallet holder *can* reasonably assume that the wallet will stay in his pocket, because otherwise they wouldn't have put it there.

*Then he would not have put it there.*
If he were reasonable, and knew thieves could get his wallet from his pocket, and wanted to control his wallet, then he would have kept it in his hand.

The sheer fact that you can do something he thinks won't 'reasonably' happen proves he is not a logician.

Reality includes theft. You're constructing an agent that doesn't think theft will happen, and naming it reasonable.
--
But then, the beliefs of the owner don't need to come into this, you are asserting contradictory beliefs in the thief's mind, right? So let's lay out just what he believes.

Alrenous said...

Your rebuttals?

I think I've found the problem...

As I look at it, I have an overwhelming upper hand at this point.

If we went by confidence, the Creation vs Evolution debate would be a tie. We require an objective standard of truth.

You can see the same thing in fights between George Cochran and Mencius Moldbug.

I'd like you to restate your argument with the terminology you're using now, as it seems different than what you used before.

It is. And I'll likely do so when we're done arguing.

and wanted to control his wallet, then he would have kept it in his hand.


I have never had my wallet stolen. Have you?

How is it not reasonable for me to assume that my wallet is going to stay in my pocket until I decide otherwise?
--

The relevant parts of the thief's beliefs depend on reasonable expectation of control. (Ownership.)

James Andrix said...

I have never had my wallet stolen. Have you?
No.

How is it not reasonable for me to assume that my wallet is going to stay in my pocket until I decide otherwise?


Because pickpockets exist. No logician would conclude something false. If the fact is his wallet was stolen then he never reasoned it would not be.

The pocket is essentially indirect unattended control like the chain and rock were.

A human might think chains and pockets give them control, but they really don't.

And no, neither does holding it in your hand either.

You could talk about probabilities or fuzzy logic as 'reasonable' but I think that will just erase the contradiction of your thief.

Alrenous said...

>Because pickpockets exist. No logician would conclude something false.

That's retarded. Offense intended, because that constitutes an insult.

What's false is that I have, or (probably) will ever, have my wallet stolen.

I mean, you think my argument is circular and then say crap like this. It's hard to believe you're even trying to see what I'm saying.

Furthermore, I have recourse. If the police weren't so useless, I'd likely get my wallet back.

What's unreasonable is to assume otherwise.

And since you are apparently unreasonable in exactly this manner, can I conclude that you don't carry your wallet around?

What else is unreasonable to expect control of?

Since hands don't do it, I guess you don't control your keyboard. How are you typing this?

Why are you typing this? You don't expect that it will get to me.

Your argument is self-refuting, and super-self-refuting.

James Andrix said...

Maybe, just maybe, you should offer a good definition of reasonable.

and control.

And just just so your definition actually becomes meaningful, why not 'expectation' too?

I mean, you think my argument is circular and then say crap like this.
Furthermore, I have recourse. If the police weren't so useless, I'd likely get my wallet back.

Why would they give you back 'your' wallet?

What's false is that I have, or (probably) will ever, have my wallet stolen.

Probably? Either you will have your wallet stolen or you won't. Can you conclude, based on currently available information, that you won't?

I can't conclude that my wallet won't be stolen today.

What's unreasonable is to assume otherwise.

Correct, a logician would also rarely conclude that his wallet would be stolen, since pickpockets are fairly rare.

What else is unreasonable to expect control of?

Conclusively? Just about nothing. Have you been checked for brain aneurysms lately? me neither.

Why are you typing this? You don't expect that it will get to me.

Lots of things become 'reasonable' courses of action given a nonzero probability of failure.

Alrenous said...

I don't need to define control. Just look in the dictionary. Second, goals. Just, the concept of goals.

And just just so your definition actually becomes meaningful, why not 'expectation' too?

That's incredible. You seriously expect me to define 'expectation' for you?

I mean, if so, please define 'define.' (Yes, this is the kind of argument you're using.)

I also already stated that I have to handwave 'reasonable' and I've suggested that it may be related to having 'reasons.' Also I've demonstrated several times how to employ the reasoning.

And frankly it's obvious from the statement, "If you did not reasonably expect your wallet to stay in your pocket, you wouldn't put it there."

Just fiddle with it until that statement is true. Then, that's what I mean.

You apparently keep using what my brother calls "The Dark Art of Being Right." You fiddle with the statement until it's wrong, and argue with that.

Probably? Either you will have your wallet stolen or you won't. Can you conclude, based on currently available information, that you won't?

You don't know how to deal with probability at all, do you?

I can't conclude that my wallet won't be stolen today.


Hypothesis confirmed. I said, "I hope I don't have to add an analysis of why, even though our data is probabilistic, we cannot make our goals probabilistic." I said this for a reason.

You seem quite fond of ignoring critical parts of my essays and posts. In other words, it doesn't look like I can allow you to decide what you find interesting. I have to diagnose your ignorances and rectify them, without your help.

Unfortunately I still have to rely on you to accept my help. However, if you do not, then there really isn't any point in continuing. (Alternatively you could stop ignoring the critical parts. I just don't see this as likely.)

You have to conclude such. Your options are; act like your wallet will be stolen; don't act like your wallet will be stolen. You cannot half-act like your wallet will be stolen. You cannot half take your wallet with you.

I do not know if my wallet will be stolen. However, since I can't 98% act like my wallet won't be stolen, I 100% act like my wallet won't be stolen. Just as you do.

Correct, a logician would also rarely conclude that his wallet would be stolen, since pickpockets are fairly rare.

Since the only other option is to act as if it won't be stolen...

A logician concludes that they must act as if it won't be stolen. Then, they reason from this assumption of 100% probability.

If they find it unreasonable to conclude that it won't be stolen, they either don't take it with them, or take precautions until it is reasonable again.

Since everyone is a logician to some extent, we can conclude that everyone who is carrying a wallet expects to keep carrying that wallet. Further, since they aren't insane, we can conclude that this is a reasonable belief.

That is, it might be wrong, but if they assume so, their goals will be less well met than if they assume they do.

Again, hinging on the fact that they can only take one side - they cannot half assume. They cannot half take their wallet with them.

Conclusively? Just about nothing. Have you been checked for brain aneurysms lately? me neither.

Ah, skepticism. So, nothing may be true. But wait! I'm still achieving my goals. So it really doesn't matter if stuff's true or not.

I can still make probability judgement accurately. Since I can't half-act, I act as if the highest probability is a certainty. Whenever I'm right, (which is by definition the most probable) there will be no contradiction. Since the only other option is to act as if the unprobable is a certainty, this is the only reasonable course of action.

Certainly, I can act as if my wallet will be stolen. However, if I do, my wallet basically becomes useless.

Why does the statement, "Act as if your wallet may be stolen" map exactly onto trying to half-take your wallet with you?

If they really thought their wallet would be stolen, they wouldn't have it. Presumably, they aren't simply walking nonchalantly around. They are taking some kind of precaution against theft. That is, they are attempting to retain control of the wallet with respect to people who do not respect this expectation of control. Perhaps a small chain to a belt loop.

In other words, they act exactly the same as if they thought that this chain would perfectly prevent theft. (Aside from some anxiety and stress which isn't logically relevant.)

Thus, having taken this action, this 'act as if your wallet may be stolen,' the logical consequences of it must be exactly the same as the action, 'act as if your wallet will not be stolen.' This is because the physical consquences are exactly the same.

If the logical consequences actually, truly diverge, then all we've proven is that logic is broken and useless. It must parallel the physics. It must also be stateless. The relation between this physical situation and others is irrelevant. You must be able to fully find the consequences of any particular situation in isolation (by definition, situations can be physically isolated.) This is because otherwise, the logical consequences of objects would change depending on where they were, even though the object itself is not changing, and thus contradictions would exist.

Thus, there is no need to even consider the half-possibility. Either you think your wallet will be stolen, or you don't.

Law of excluded middle. Will my wallet be stolen? Yes/no. Critically, this is not a complex question. Maybe doesn't make sense in this context. You cannot half take your wallet with you. You cannot half type on the keyboard and half hit the comment button.

Lots of things become 'reasonable' courses of action given a nonzero probability of failure.

I thought so. You do know what reasonable means. Kindly start acting like you do.

James Andrix said...

Authority or ability to manage or direct

Since authority is more or less what you seek to prove, let's stick with ability to manage or direct.

Second, goals. Just, the concept of goals.

I have no idea what you're saying here.

I mean, if so, please define 'define.' (Yes, this is the kind of argument you're using.)

I'm not making a 'precise' definition of something that includes the word define.

I also already stated that I have to handwave 'reasonable' and I've suggested that it may be related to having 'reasons.' Also I've demonstrated several times how to employ the reasoning.

You're handaving does not make for a precise definition.
In particular, you seem to be equivocating between the loose meaning when normal people are expecting things, and the the conclusions of perfect logicians when pointing to contradictions.


Hypothesis confirmed. I said, "I hope I don't have to add an analysis of why, even though our data is probabilistic, we cannot make our goals probabilistic." I said this for a reason.

Are you talking about goals or actions?

I 100% act like my wallet won't be stolen. Just as you do.

No, i absolutely do not. I act like my wallet might be stolen.

A logician concludes that they must act as if it won't be stolen.
A logician concludes no such thing. Why not conclude that it will be stolen, what is the probability cuttoff?

it might have been more clear if I had said "Correct, a logician would also rarely conclude that his wallet would certainly be stolen, since pickpockets are fairly rare."
A logician will rarely conclude that his wallet will be stolen. He will rarely conclude that his wallet will not be stolen. He is not trapped concluding one or the other, or acting as if one or the other is true with 100% certainty.

Since everyone is a logician to some extent, we can conclude that everyone who is carrying a wallet expects to keep carrying that wallet. Further, since they aren't insane, we can conclude that this is a reasonable belief.

People are rational, ergo they expect what I say is rational. They are not irrational, ergo what I say is rational is rational.
This is not even an argument. You paint the conclusions of partially flawed logicians as reasonable, because flawed logicians concluded it.


::Conclusively? Just about nothing. Have you been checked for brain aneurysms lately? me neither.

Ah, skepticism. So, nothing may be true. But wait! I'm still achieving my goals. So it really doesn't matter if stuff's true or not.


I didn't say nothing's true. You didn't ask me about truth. You asked me what it was reasonable to expect to control. That requires either a perfect causual connection, or perfect knowledge of the future. Neither of which we have. We only have a probability of controling anything.

Again, hinging on the fact that they can only take one side - they cannot half assume. They cannot half take their wallet with them.

No, they can take zero or one sides. They don't know if their wallet will be stolen. They can act like they don't know. Sometimes both P and not-P are unprovable.

Why does the statement, "Act as if your wallet may be stolen" map exactly onto trying to half-take your wallet with you?
In your mind? Probably some kind of bias. In reality it does not.

If they really thought their wallet would be stolen, they wouldn't have it. Presumably, they aren't simply walking nonchalantly around. They are taking some kind of precaution against theft. That is, they are attempting to retain control of the wallet with respect to people who do not respect this expectation of control. Perhaps a small chain to a belt loop.

So a perfect logician can act on the 100% assumption that his wallet will be stolen by using a chain AND act on the 100% assumption that it will not be stolen by walking around with it?

Interesting.

Thus, having taken this action, this 'act as if your wallet may be stolen,' the logical consequences of it must be exactly the same as the action, 'act as if your wallet will not be stolen.' This is because the physical consquences are exactly the same.

Except one person has a chain and the other does not. 'having taken this action' does not erase this. And a wallet chain does not encompass all the precautions people take.

Do you have ALL your money in your wallet? and the deed to your house and your car title and your birth certificate? or do you keep some things in a 'safe place'?
I have emergency money in several different places. Becuase my wallet might be stolen.

A logican would never conclude that his wallet will not be stolen, and if he wants his wallet, he will never act like he knows it won't be. He will wiegh the risks of theft (fairly low proability, possibly high cost) against the usefulness of bringing the wallet. He will also take steps to lower the probability and costs of theft. (Carrying a credit card instead of cash.)

If somehow he knows with certainty his wallet will not be stolen, or for some reason believes he ought to act that way, then he will take no such precautions.

Now, you seem to think that, once someone has taken all the precautions against the probability of theft that they think they need to, they are acting as if they believe those precautions are complete, and the probability of theft is zero.

A logician would at some point decide that precautions against theft are more costly than the expected loss. He doesn't set the probability to 0, or act like it is.

Either you think your wallet will be stolen, or you don't.
Not if you are rational. if you are rational, you don't know, and you know you don't know.
The truth must be one or the other. And if it happens we can know the truth, but we don't know the future, and we don't know what we can control.

::Lots of things become 'reasonable' courses of action given a nonzero probability of failure.

I thought so. You do know what reasonable means.


Notice I put it in quotes. I thought I was using in a way that you haven't been.

Do you mean "what a logician does after a risk analysis"? (reasonable thing to do) or "pretending you know the future because it is sort of predictable" ('reasonable' expectation)?

Concluding something is a reasonable course of action is not the same as concluding that some premise that would also lead to that action is true.

Kindly start acting like you do.

I'm sure you're not suggesting I should steal, but one of the things that can become 'reasonable' is theft.

Alrenous said...

I suggest you summarize a counter-proposal so that I can see where you're coming from.

James Andrix said...

A proposal for what?

I don't really want to show property rights.

If I did want to show property rights directly with logic, I would probably posit a right to exist.

I haven't developed any good theory that shows they don't exist or are very limited.

On the other hand, if ownership is control expected because of police and laws, then I think that's a pretty good argument that property is just a social construct.

Alrenous said...

So are you just learning logic or have you done anything novel yet?

If so, could I have a summary of that?

James Andrix said...

I wouldn't call it novel, but I wrote this piece on 'free will'. It is primarily intended to point out the conflict between omniscience and free will in Christianity.

http://postergasm.blogspot.com/2007/07/you-have-free-will.html

Alrenous said...

Even omniscient beings cannot know what has not been determined. They simply know the probabilities and what will lead to the various outcomes.

Perhaps you did in fact determine your choices, but long ago, and thus it's just a matter of playing it out, and thus a putative omniscience can know what you're going to do.

Etc...


If you really thought that you could not expect to keep your wallet under your control in, say, a mall, you wouldn't take it. Thus, you do expect to keep it under your control, either through physical security measures, through lack of thieves, or through societal support.

This control only has to be at a level high enough to meet the initial goal of having a wallet in the first place.

Naturally, if you couldn't expect enough control to meet that goal in the first place, you would never have acquired a wallet. It would have been a waste of time.

James Andrix said...

'enough control' clarifies things a bit.

I've been mulling over your argument, I _think_ it can be boiled down to this:

"A thief must believe both that a person[theif] can control what they expect to control, and that a person[owner] can not control what they expect to control. This is believing a contradiction."

Is that about right?

I've been having trouble with your description of reasonableness. If I have it right: "You only do what you reasonably expect to succeed at." The thief knows you expect to control your wallet, because you're at least somewhat trying.

The problem I have with how you are applying this is that it seems to imply that if someone attempts something, they should not be interfered with.

James Andrix said...

oh, and as for omniscience:

Your first argument doesn't describe the christian god, he knows everything with certainty.

Your second argument diverges enough from what I think we both think about physics that I could have some fun with someone who actually proposed that.

Also, the people who are trying to get me saved don't seem to be operating from that kind of predestination. They would have me believe there is a choice I can make today. 'have free will' is not quite the same as 'had free will'

Alrenous said...

"A thief must believe both that a person[theif] can control what they expect to control, and that a person[owner] can not control what they expect to control. This is believing a contradiction."

Is that about right?


Yes. Critically, the [owner]/[thief] are not significantly different; a belief about the relationship to one can be reversed to be about the reverse relationship.

I'm not sure anymore whether I have to invoke morals beforehand or not. I think normative beliefs are automatically generated (the thief acts based on norms) and automatically universal, but I'm not sure.

I've been having trouble with your description of reasonableness.

So, I say 'expect to control.' This is a sticking point between us.

A person cannot ever 100% expect to control anything. The molecules, meteorite strikes, unknown information, black swans of all types, etc, are always in the way. However, at some point a person has to act. At some point there are sufficient reasons to assume that a meteorite won't strike, or that theft protections are sufficient.

At this point it is reasonable to assume/expect to control whatever it is.

This becomes a bit tautological; without this reasonable expectation, control won't even be attempted in the first place. Because of this, 'reasonable expectation of control' closely matches the current intuition on 'ownership' and is probably the intended definition.

The problem I have with how you are applying this is that it seems to imply that if someone attempts something, they should not be interfered with.

Assume that the attempt - a theft - is regular and they aren't interfered with. It's no longer reasonable to expect to control a wallet, and the person won't own one in any sense.

As a result, there won't be anything to steal. This isn't a justification of the moral argument.

Instead, this means that any consistent expansion of ownership - property rights - always increases wealth, that is, the number of things an individual can control.

Obviously, there is some basic level of property that is always immoral to contravene. For instance, at least self-ownership. My main point is that consistent expansions remain immoral. If someone can expect to control a wallet, everyone can expect to control a wallet, and thefts of wallets is hypocritical.

By the way, thank you for your persistence. This way of wording it is new, and, I think, better.

This is regardless of whether you're convinced or not, notably.

---
God can't be certain about things that aren't certain. He would simply be certain that they aren't certain.

Your second argument diverges enough from what I think we both think about physics that I could have some fun with someone who actually proposed that.

True. I ran across it when analyzing free will as a concept.

Suppose strong determinism, the Big Bang, but also God. God then tweaks the particulars of the primordial energy-soup such that all our decisions - by assumption determined by physics - were made essentially by Him. Free will still exists, however, all the decisions have already been made. In a sense, our 'souls' would simply be parts or manifestations of God.

This scenario is, obviously, pretty strange. Anything with similar logical properties are going to be just as strange. The only point in considering it is to understand the concepts of determinism and free will.

Also, the people who are trying to get me saved

Anyone doing this violates your intellectual property rights. You have some beliefs. You're not asking to have them changed. Thus, it is against your goals of control for someone to attempt to change them. (Philosophy in everything! Technically we're on topic...)

don't seem to be operating from that kind of predestination.

A mistake I've seen before. Assuming God tweaked the Big Bang, how does anyone know that the precise determination/cause of your 'salvation' is or isn't their irksome badgering?

And anyway their choices were made for them by God. The decision to badger you has already been made.

You know, I could just make a post about this and we could argue about it in that post's comments instead. Get some organization going.

James Andrix said...

Yes. Critically, the [owner]/[thief] are not significantly different; a belief about the relationship to one can be reversed to be about the reverse relationship.

From another point of view, person[thief]/person[owner] is equivocation.

::The problem I have with how you are applying this is that it seems to imply that if someone attempts something, they should not be interfered with.

Assume that the attempt - a theft - is regular and they aren't interfered with. It's no longer reasonable to expect to control a wallet, and the person won't own one in any sense.


I'm not sure what I mean should be described as a theft situation.

Splashy and Calmy (not their real names) are both walking in the wilderness on a calm day. Everything around is unowned. They come upon a beautiful lake.
Splashy want to see a big splash in the water, so he picks up a big rock and throws it in.
Calmy preferred the lake surface undisturbed and prefers that it remain henceforth undisturbed.

Splashy picks up another rock and begin to throw it.

Now at this point:
* Splashy reasonably expects to succeed at throwing rock2. (and have no problem with what I think your usage of reasonable is in this context, if I have it right.)
* Calmy reasonably believes splashy reasonably expects to succeed, and
* Calmy also expects you will succeed if he does not intervene.

Now, If Calmy had a gun, and had said 'If you pick up another Rock, you're dead.' Then splashy would not expect to succeed at throwing the rock, and would not pick up a rock.

But calmy is unarmed, and slow to speak, so splashy is about to throw the rock.

Also at this same point in time:
* The lake is a commons neither very much controls. They didn't wake up expecting to control the lake, lacking any real machines, there is nothing they can do very little to it and stop very little that happens to it. We both know this.
* They both could affect the lake in the same ways, I could also throw a rock if I wanted to. We both know this.
* They want different things for the lake, splashes and calm. Calmy has inferred splashy wants splashes, splashy does not know calmy wants calm, calmy doesn't know if splashy knows what calmy wants. (calmy hasn't communicated it, but thinks splashy might have guessed. I think assuming that calmy assumes splashy doesn't know is the simpler hypothetical. So let's say calmy reasonably expects splashy not to know.)
* splashy can achieve his desires for the lake by taking reasonable control of a rock and throwing it. Given that splashy attempts to do so, calmy can only achieve his desires for the lake by interfering with splashy's ability to succeed.
* If calmy respects splashy's reasonable expectation to control the rock, then calmy's desires are subordinated to splashy's, merely because splashy is trying to do something and calmy is not.

and THAT is what I meant by "The problem I have with how you are applying this is that it seems to imply that if someone attempts something, they should not be interfered with."

So, calmy grabs the rock in splashy's hand, because he reasonably expects to control the rock enough to achieve his goal of no further splashes.
Neither of them lose their grip, and the rock is big enough that their hands don't touch so all their direct-control interactions are through the rock.

Is Calmy a rock thief at that point? Is Calmy justified because Splashy didn't bother to determine Calmy's desires about the state of the lake?

If nobody lets go, what are the new reasonable expectations about the rock? How do they resolve the dispute?

As a result, there won't be anything to steal. This isn't a justification of the moral argument.
Understood.

If someone can expect to control a wallet, everyone can expect to control a wallet, and thefts of wallets is hypocritical.

I'm not sure this logical equivalence principle is solid.
If everyone can expect to control a wallet, then what of people who don't have wallets? The expectation of control is contingent on the situation of perceiving a wallet in a controllable state. I think lots of people would prefer their particular wallets, so they need to percieve that and make plans about that. People's differnt situations and perception will lead then to different conclusions.

--

God can't be certain about things that aren't certain. He would simply be certain that they aren't certain.

If one of my baptists conceded that, it would be a win. The biblical god has to know everything-everything.

Anyone doing this violates your intellectual property rights. You have some beliefs. You're not asking to have them changed. Thus, it is against your goals of control for someone to attempt to change them. (Philosophy in everything! Technically we're on topic...)

How are my auditory neurons when I'm in a public square different than the transistor in my camera when you are in front of a fountain?
And does that mean Calmy can't alter Splashy's worldview?

You know, I could just make a post about this and we could argue about it in that post's comments instead.

I agree, but it will be slower conversation. Anarcho-capitalist theology makes my head hurt.

Alrenous said...

Splashy and Calmy (not their real names) :)

If calmy respects splashy's reasonable expectation to control the rock, then calmy's desires are subordinated to splashy's, merely because splashy is trying to do something and calmy is not.

First, this accurately describes how we treat the situation now.

Next, yes.

Third, Calmy can in fact make known hid preference.

So, calmy grabs the rock in splashy's hand, because he reasonably expects to control the rock enough to achieve his goal of no further splashes.

True, but this is a hypocritical act; to knowingly interfere with someone else's ownership. (Ignorance is a defense.)

Note that grabbing the rock while still on the ground is a grey area. (I'm pretty sure I tried this as a child a few times.) It interrupts expectation before actual control is achieved. I'm not sure what this means.

Is Calmy a rock thief at that point?

I think the exact term is assault, but yes. (Not as assualt rifle, which legally would be a battery rifle...)

Is Calmy justified because Splashy didn't bother to determine Calmy's desires about the state of the lake?

No. This is another case showing the necessity of 'reasonable'. Calmy has a desire, not a reasonable expectation of control. (Calmy may expect control, but if we tested his control, it would be shown to be non-existent.)

Assuming Splashy and Calmy are walking together because they're friends, if Calmy asks Splashy to stop, and Splashy simply refuses, it's rude, but it's not immoral.

If Calmy hasn't made his desires clear, then again, ignorance is a defense. (Not that we can properly implement it in a court system.)

If nobody lets go, what are the new reasonable expectations about the rock? How do they resolve the dispute?

If nobody lets go we discover who first had ownership and grant it to them.


In short, Calmy's desire for a calm lake is a very expensive desire; Calmy must first acquire ownership of the lake if he wants to guarantee it.

There was a similar case recently at my friend's dad's (Jerry's) cottage at Perry Sound. The neighbour (call him Eigb) is a naturalist and doesn't like Jerry's efforts to landscape. He obviously feels entitled to this desire, especially as the previous owner's habits were aligned.

However, the fact is that Jerry owns that land. If Eigb attempted to contravene that control, Jerry can call in the State. Eigb's desire to live on a nature reserve is a very expensive desire; he must first buy all that land.

This comes from a very understandable confusion. Imagine that Eigb was the first to build a cottage. Eigb gets a wildnerness paradise with a roof to sleep under. It's very nice. Later, his experience is degraded because others come in and build their own cottages.

Eigb complains, and often we see this as a possibly legitimate complaint about others' externalities negatively affecting Eigb's property.

However, the fact is that for Eigb to legitimately keep (control) that natural landscape he has to own it. To complain of neighbours moving is is like getting a Beemer for $100 and then complaining when it later turns out there's another $1000 to keep it. Eigb was, by luck, getting a very expensive commodity very cheaply.

Note, none of this takes a stance on whether we should or should not conserve the natural landscape. It merely recognizes that doing so meaningfully is very expensive. (Even more expensive when taking in opportunity costs.)


I'm not sure this logical equivalence principle is solid.

There isn't a logically consistent case wherein some people with wallets can expect to control them and some people can't. (Legally speaking, not counting natural disasters and so forth.)

That is, of everyone who buys or makes a wallet, there isn't some subset that can't expect to control them. (Presumably due to unknown factors, otherwise, they wouldn't make them.)

[Alternatively] that is, having set up a structure such that one person can reasonably expect to control a wallet, you cannot logically bar anyone else from reasonably controlling a wallet.

Also there's the case of people legally barred from acquiring wallets. This is invalid in the case of making your own, (directly from self-ownership) which means it's generally invalid as a logical principle. (May still be practical in complex cases such as computers. Also, I think we're allowed to make exceptions in the case of criminals or the mad for things like guns and cars. But generally, we should prosecute people for crimes, not for potential crimes. Also, you should be allowed to refuse to sell if you want: it's your property.)

---
Post regarding free will and determinism is upcoming and I'll answer your comment in the comments there. I'll post a link here when it's done.

James Andrix said...

First, this accurately describes how we treat the situation now.

Next, yes.


Well, no it really doesn't, because this model allows people to completely trash the commons. What if the lake is the ocean, and the rocks are shipping containers of powdered plutonium? Real world laws can be made to correct for this, because real laws, for all their faults, aren't just logically extended out from one overarching rule.

I don't see how you can patch that hole at all. You're either going to tell people that they can't throw things places, which violates their property rights, or you're going to let them destroy the commons.

Third, Calmy can in fact make known hid preference.

Great, what would that accomplish?
If Splashy has no respect for calmy's desires concerning the lake, he will simply continue.

If nobody lets go we discover who first had ownership and grant it to them.

Who's going to do that? The cops? over a rock in the woods?
Two reasonable people, friends or no, should be able to determine the correct course of action by your principle.

In short, Calmy's desire for a calm lake is a very expensive desire;

Why is Calmy's desire 'more expensive' than Splashy's? They both want the same water to be in a certain state. Why shouldn't splashy have to 'aquire ownership' before he manipulates the lake in ways that affect other people's desires for it?

If the lake had previously been behaving according to calmy's preferences isn't that less expensive? Don't the physics agree with the theory that calmy already owned the lake? after all, he doesn't need to spend a rock to meet his goals.

But no, I think you're right, and that's the problem. I may have to refine this, but:

Your theory of property gives preferential influence of any commons to whoever wants to increase entropy the fastest.

That's bad. I can burn the wilderness, but you can't unburn it, and you can barely stop it burning.

Splashy or burny, or nukey or smelly or ugly will be able to easily do something to every commons, of whatever nature, that is easier to to than to undo or prevent.

And you can't stop them without interfering with their property.

And if you make everything owned, there is a whole other set of problems.

Calmy must first acquire ownership of the lake if he wants to guarantee it.

Isn't that what he just did? How do you EVER enforce property rights except by infringing on some real or imagined property rights of another?
If Splashy wants to reassert reliable control over the rock, he will have to pry it from calmy's fingers. Calmy can likewise escalate the conflict.

(Legally speaking, .......having set up a structure such that one person can reasonably expect...

If it always comes back to cops, courts, and laws, then why not drop the complicated philosophy and say that property is what the police and the state enforce?

Alrenous said...

If it always comes back to cops, courts, and laws, then why not drop the complicated philosophy and say that property is what the police and the state enforce?

It doesn't always come back to that. Property exists, though less so, outside of enforcement. Property can be expanded in ways other than state intervention.

Well, no it really doesn't, because this model allows people to completely trash the commons.

Because the tragedy of the commons doesn't already exist...

Conflates two issues. One is the process whereby unowned things become owned. I haven't yet examined how this should come about, but it clearly leads directly from the definition of 'own.'

That is, there are commons that are supposedly 'publicly owned' and commons which are, even formally, unowned. 'Publicly owned' is a contradiction. Either you have part ownership (including the part 'all') or you have no ownership. And since ownership is basically identical to control, and commons are not publicly controlled...

What if the lake is the ocean, and the rocks are shipping containers of powdered plutonium?

This can be dealt with by contracts. It's simple; your security agency (currently states) refuses to secure your property if you dump plutonium.* Not every proscribed act has to be legally/morally proscribed. The term I've seen used before is aesthetic morals, so plutonium dumping is aesthetically proscribed.

*(Note that this breaks reasonable expectation of control; complex sub-economies cannot generally self-secure. So dumping plutonium would immediately result in a reversion of all the relevant assets to a free state. Certainly the firm may attempt to retain some assets, but without backup would generally fail.)

Also there's the real fact that even small plutonium spills will eventually harm actual property, and thus a prosecution can be based on that fact.

And indeed, why would we proscribe acts that do not -ever- harm real property?

Real world laws can be made to correct for this, because real laws, for all their faults, aren't just logically extended out from one overarching rule.

I still doubt I have to correct my statement that property should be ten tenths of the law.

I don't see how you can patch that hole at all.

Hopefully the above begins this process.

or you're going to let them destroy the commons.

Because I like repeating myself, four words: already happens; space junk.

If space had a clear owner, this kind of crap wouldn't be allowed. At the very least we'd know who to bill for the cleanup.

If Splashy has no respect for calmy's desires concerning the lake, he will simply continue.

If Calmy has a claim of harm to property instead of simply a desire, he might get further.

Who's going to do that? The cops? over a rock in the woods?

I thought this was leading up to an example involving plutonium.

Two reasonable people, friends or no

This is support disguised as an objection.

Why is Calmy's desire 'more expensive' than Splashy's?

Because it costs more money. (Proxy for resources.)

They both want the same water to be in a certain state.

Owning a lake is harder than owning a rock.

Why shouldn't splashy have to 'aquire ownership' before he manipulates the lake in ways that affect other people's desires for it?

Because desires are not control. Or have we wandered into your ideology's world? If so, I have no idea what 'desire' significates, because I'm not sure what your ideology is.

If the lake had previously been behaving according to calmy's preferences isn't that less expensive?

I posted a lengthy example explaining exactly this situation. He's freeloading on luck. Beemers for $100. (The analogy is not exact. I have to ignore the contractual implications of the Beemer exchange.)

Don't the physics agree with the theory that calmy already owned the lake?

Calmy controlled the lake in no way, shape, or form, let alone reasonably. It was simply in a state that agreed with his desires, by chance.

There's a simple test for reasonable control; try to contravene that control. Calmy has to fight Splashy for the rock. A thief has to evade the cops. If Splashy has put reasonable safeguards on his rock and/or wallet, the control will be difficult or impossible to divert.

(Note that in functioning modern societies, 'reasonable' safeguards on your wallet are basically no safeguards. You just don't have to worry about it.)

In the case of sovereignty, this control must be absolute. If any other sovereign power can wrest control away by force, it generally will. (Subject to profitability; no conquests just for revenge. Irrational people aren't subject to reasonable expectations or charges of hypocrisy, anyway.)

In individuals the criteria is less strict. However...

Splashy doesn't have to do anything to contravene Calmy's supposed control. In fact he can contravene it by accident. Try stealing my wallet by accident, and evading a putative effective police force by accident.

That's bad. I can burn the wilderness, but you can't unburn it, and you can barely stop it burning.

There's no point in randomly burning the wilderness.

Second, all the land on Earth is already owned, which is actually part of the problem; we cannot field-test solutions to the unowned-owned transition.

(I just realized this isn't strictly true. All the land is owned, but most of the sea is not. Hooray for field-testing.)

But my basic solution is that, through an unexamined mechanism, as soon as someone starts affecting the wilderness, they own it. That is, they have secured the security for that part of the wilderness, which is why they expect to gain from controlling it, and so they own it, which means it's not in the commons. Thus they have an incentive to manage it properly.

For complicated reasons this is the best you can do. "If everyone is infected with the 28-days later virus, no incentive system will stop their all-devouring wrath." Irrational people cannot be feasibly controlled; we have to trust that most people are rational.

And you can't stop them without interfering with their property.

Except, as I repeat, that their actions usually harm existing property, and are thus hypocritical. Similarly security corporations generally have inter-working contracts that incentivize them to punish this kind of behaviour.

A very controversial point; this function could be taken over by banks, so that guns aren't pointing everywhere all the time.

And if you make everything owned, there is a whole other set of problems.

All land on Earth is already controlled, as is a good bit of the sea and space. Some of it is mismanaged in such a way as to give the impression of non-ownership, and of course there are loopholes.

Isn't that what he just did?

Remember that ownership is 'expectation of control.' No, Calmy does not control the lake, and probably doesn't expect to.

How do you EVER enforce property rights except by infringing on some real or imagined property rights of another?

Expand incrementally from self-ownership and remember that using ownership to violate ownership doesn't make any sense.

If Splashy wants to reassert reliable control over the rock, he will have to pry it from calmy's fingers. Calmy can likewise escalate the conflict.

Which is why we try to come up with a simple rule beforehand to figure out who's in the right. Basically, so that the outcome of such a conflict is certain, so that it doesn't happen in the first place.

There isn't a simpler rule than 'reasonable expectation of control.' Splashy reasonably expected to control the rock, so it's not Calmy's prerogative to alter that expectation after the fact.


To come back to your police point...

The reason that I frame property in moral terms is that, assuming I'm right, humans will generally self-enforce property, as most people are good. (And we're screwed anyway if they're not.) If Calmy knows he's doing wrong and Splashy knows he isn't, very likely the dispute will not arise in the first place and if it does, Calmy will apologize, recant, deliberately fail, or get pwned by his community in the aftermath.

As a result, our lives would be a whole lot clearer and simpler, and security would be a crapton cheaper. Also everyone will get a lot richer because property rights will naturally expand.

Alrenous said...

My Free Will screed is now up!

I don't actually intend you to read the whole thing. It was an essay sitting in my mind on the subject, and I decided that we should split the discussion, and under that post is a good place to do it. My response to your comment is in the comments section.


Also I missed a bit of one of my responses, so here it is.

How are my auditory neurons when I'm in a public square different than the transistor in my camera when you are in front of a fountain?

First case; announcements don't count for a variety of reasons. They are equivalent to my decision to loiter in front of a fountain.

Second case; you have freedom of association even in public squares; if someone doesn't leave you alone when you ask them to, it's harassment. (Basic self-ownership.)

And does that mean Calmy can't alter Splashy's worldview?

Not if Splashy asks Calmy not to.

While I think in general unauthorized polemics are exactly intellectual vandalism, there has to be some provision to allow authorization to occur. Presumably this is under ignorance is a defense; Calmy cannot know in advance Splashy's wishes regarding his IP. Calmy is most welcome to notify Splashy of the difference of opinion.

Man, lob me some more softballs. (You did. Thanks!)

Notably, in this case, the tag 'I think' refers to the fact that I have a proof, but it's unreviewed.

Alrenous said...

Well, goodbye, James Andrix. Despite a seriously rocky start there, you really did help me clarify my thoughts.

I was looking forward to knowing what you thought of my solutions to the various problems you raised.

Oh well.

For third parties; Since he appears to have stopped coming, I doubt I'll bother to re-write this piece, as he requested. I know what's going on, so unless there's demand it's a waste of my time.

James Andrix said...

Oh I'm not done just yet.

Because the tragedy of the commons doesn't already exist...

It is not fundamentally protected. Current legal systems can patch this because they can outlaw arbitrary behaviors, such as littering.

Conflates two issues. One is the process whereby unowned things become owned. I haven't yet examined how this should come about, but it clearly leads directly from the definition of 'own.'

I assumed splashy assumed ownership of the rock when he picked it up.

That is, there are commons that are supposedly 'publicly owned' and commons which are, even formally, unowned. 'Publicly owned' is a contradiction. Either you have part ownership (including the part 'all') or you have no ownership. And since ownership is basically identical to control, and commons are not publicly controlled...

Is the state though, by prohibiting littering, asserting control of the commons?

This can be dealt with by contracts. It's simple; your security agency (currently states) refuses to secure your property if you dump plutonium. [...] (Note that this breaks reasonable expectation of control; complex sub-economies cannot generally self-secure. So dumping plutonium would immediately result in a reversion of all the relevant assets to a free state. Certainly the firm may attempt to retain some assets, but without backup would generally fail.)

If a security company is required for reasonable expectation of control, then merely having it locked up in my cargo hold isn't enough?

At the end of the day, someone who has no claim to it has got to snatch it out of my hands/boat/crane

Also there's the real fact that even small plutonium spills will eventually harm actual property, and thus a prosecution can be based on that fact.

Is this prosecution only after the fact, though?

And I think we're wiggling the line on what is property, and what is harm:
"...often we see this as a possibly legitimate complaint about others' externalities negatively affecting Eigb's property. However, the fact is that for Eigb to legitimately keep (control) that natural landscape he has to own it."

And indeed, why would we proscribe acts that do not -ever- harm real property?
Maybe we don't, but I'm not sure there are any such acts in your model.

Calmy controlled the lake in no way, shape, or form, let alone reasonably. It was simply in a state that agreed with his desires, by chance.
ok I can accept that when they walked up to the lake, but the splashy reasonable expected to make a splash when the rock landed. Does he own the lake? part of it? He reasonably expects to be able to keep doing that.

There's a simple test for reasonable control; try to contravene that control. Calmy has to fight Splashy for the rock.

Now Splashy has to fight Calmy to make a splash. Calmy is exerting control over part of lake almost as well as if he had quickly put up a fence and 'no splashing sign' and hired a guard.

This still seems all about might makes right.

Splashy doesn't have to do anything to contravene Calmy's supposed control. In fact he can contravene it by accident.

In this case he's hurling a projectile. I would disapprove of giving projectile-hurling a blanket pass as 'not doing anything to contravene control' but given your model's apparent pro-entropy stance, it seems to fit.

Try stealing my wallet by accident, and evading a putative effective police force by accident.

Soon to be a major motion picture starring Ashton Kutcher. "I didn't even know i HAD it!"

There's no point in randomly burning the wilderness.
We obviously had very different childhoods.

It doesn't matter if you see a point to this particular thing. Someone will want to do it or some other non-reversible thing to the commons. Your model allows it.
Does burning the wilderness harm existing property? What if it's a controlled burn? At the end of the day, it's just a view.

Second, all the land on Earth is already owned, which is actually part of the problem; we cannot field-test solutions to the unowned-owned transition.
Another part is what happens to what remains unowned. I wouldn't say splashy or calmy own the lake, and no simple act will change that. But they want different things for it. honoring splashy's property rights by your system lead to his desires taking precedence. (or anyone else who want to do even more to the lake.)

All the land is owned, but commons are all around us. Air, most water, Portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (arguably all of it, but notably visible light.)


But my basic solution is that, through an unexamined mechanism, as soon as someone starts affecting the wilderness, they own it. That is, they have secured the security for that part of the wilderness, which is why they expect to gain from controlling it, and so they own it, which means it's not in the commons. Thus they have an incentive to manage it properly.

Neil Armstrong owns the moon? Splashy owns the lake?
Going back to entropy: This gives ownership of the universe to whoever blows it up first.

I think we'd better examine this mechanism.

All land on Earth is already controlled, as is a good bit of the sea and space.

Yes, and one key problem with that is that I no longer have a right to exist. My existence is contingent on having land to exist on, and that is contingent on getting permission from some landowner. Usually through payment.

::How do you EVER enforce property rights except by infringing on some real or imagined property rights of another?
Expand incrementally from self-ownership and remember that using ownership to violate ownership doesn't make any sense.


So I do have a right to exist then?

Which is why we try to come up with a simple rule beforehand to figure out who's in the right. Basically, so that the outcome of such a conflict is certain, so that it doesn't happen in the first place.

There isn't a simpler rule than 'reasonable expectation of control.'


But your rule doesn't show who's in the right, so that society can back up the person in the right. It rests on the assumption that society will back the person with the reasonable expectation. But then at other times an expectation is reasonable because society will back it.

assuming I'm right, humans will generally self-enforce property,

Aha, perhaps you should drop your conclusion from your assumptions.

First case; announcements don't count for a variety of reasons. They are equivalent to my decision to loiter in front of a fountain.

Trashing the commons is ok, got it.

Second case; you have freedom of association even in public squares; if someone doesn't leave you alone when you ask them to, it's harassment. (Basic self-ownership.)

If you can walk somewhere public, then why can't I? If and evangelist is talking and I don't want to hear it, which of us has to leave? What if we both want to stand in the nice area of the commons? How does harassment extend from self-ownership? Now I'm telling him where he can walk and talk based on what I want to hear?

As for what I think of your solutions, they are an endless series of patches. they just lead to other problems.
And I don't think you ever really fixed the circular argument I first mentioned, as it keeps creeping back.

I will be making shorter replies, as I want to focus more of my attention on the discussions at overcomingbias.com .

Anyway, thanks for giving me the idea that all property regimes favor accelerating entropy. Still pondering it, but I think it might be a fundamental flaw.

Alrenous said...

Current legal systems can patch this because they can outlaw arbitrary behaviors, such as littering.

Which means that the government expect to control littering in the 'commons.' Which means it's not commons, it's just owned by the government.

then merely having it locked up in my cargo hold isn't enough?

Basically. If that's the only precaution taken, you can't reasonably expect to defend it against, say, governments or geurillas.

At the end of the day, someone who has no claim to it has got to snatch it out of my hands/boat/crane

And then they have to be able to reasonably expect to keep control of it the way you couldn't, which is a contradiction in normative logic.

Do note a crucial issue; most property must be secured to gain reasonable expectation of control.

To look at it differently than I have been, we can see that if a person is snatching things out of your hand/boat/crane, they cannot reasonably expect to be defended against anyone who does the same to them, whereas you (presumably) have a contract with a security agency for exactly that service.

Is this prosecution only after the fact, though?

Never prosecute potential crimes, only actual crimes. Generally, certain foreknowledge of prosecution deters, making fewer potential crimes without having to actually

Note that I have no objection to laws against 'attempted murder.' Attempting murder is a crime even when they fail.

Does he own the lake? part of it? He reasonably expects to be able to keep doing that.

A good question. Often brought against Locke as well. A guess; yes?

Note that his control dissipates when the ripples do.

This still seems all about might makes right.

Then I must have misstated my position relative to your understanding. Calmy must attempt to supercede Splashy's control of the rock-in-hand.

Assume Calmy is effective in stealing the rock. He cannot then, through normative logic, object to Splashy forcefully regaining the rock and throwing it into the lake.

If Calmy uses force, he only accomplishes making his position morally indefensible.

There are only two ways out; accept property rights as valid normative statements, in which case Calmy must use reason to affect Splashy, or reject property rights and then we really do have might=right.

I can see somewhat where this objection is coming from; advanced property right systems require security forces.

This is only because thieves and warlike nations do in fact exist. To have a normative statement that will never, in practice, be respected is a complete waste of time.

However, as we can see in basically all current nations, property rights do not rely on force all the time or even most of the time. Usually, people (especially civilized people) are more interested in who should own something than in who can keep hold of it by force. That is, there is totally a mechanism for enforcement-by-normative-statement.

In this case he's hurling a projectile.

I was trying to bring up a different image; tripping and stepping into the lake to regain his balance. Or, knocking a rock down the bank. In other words, contravening this supposed 'control' by accident, analogous to sneezing and finding a wallet in your hand. "Oops! I'm guilty of theft!" It doesn't make any sense.

Someone will want to do it or some other non-reversible thing to the commons.

Generally these people are teenagers, and there's very good reasons teenagers are randomly destructive. Healthy societies prevent them from acting this out, and even usually prevent them from wanting to in the first place.

No one randomly burns forest when they could be making money instead.

Your model allows it.

My model allows it if it is unowned. If not, then it's a crime. And at present this is a moot point because all forests are owned.

What if it's a controlled burn?

Then it's not random. Presumably they expect to be able to do something with resulting ashland. If it's a reasonably expectation...

honoring splashy's property rights by your system lead to his desires taking precedence. (or anyone else who want to do even more to the lake.)

Yeah, they do. I don't see this as a problem, for reasons enumerated above.

--

The air isn't commons. The air above states is owned by those states. The fact that they aren't exercising these rights does not withstand, and is probably partly because the full reason they own the air bodies is not yet known.

For instance, the US is liable for pollution that reaches Canada. The fact that Canada is not demanding restitution is not because they don't own the air.

Also we can see how current political structures would bar legitimate restitution to non-G8 states. We can also see how this is hypocritical and therefore wrong a priori.

Most of the water is at least partially owned. Again, plutonium, prosecution.

And generally, even though this system stripped of all supports allows the tragedy of the commons - which, again, is simply a non-improvement on current systems, putative 'reforms' notwithstanding - it certainly does not force anyone to defile the commons. We could just all agree not to, and I can't see anyone reasonably arguing the opposite.

This gives ownership of the universe to whoever blows it up first.

Except there will first be a race to exploit it usefully. The exploders will run out of money and the exploiters will become rich. Blowing things up to gain ownership of it is as unstable as life that sucks at surviving.

Your cynicism is familiar to me. Public schools have evolved to inculcate it, as have papers. This cynicism is very useful to schools and papers.

That plus a smart security agency may simply refuse to secure property gained by explosions. It would not be as profitable as securing economically developed property.

Yes, and one key problem with that is that I no longer have a right to exist. My existence is contingent on having land to exist on, and that is contingent on getting permission from some landowner. Usually through payment.

You're really good at describing the status quo.

So I do have a right to exist then?

Self-ownership. I dunno, do you?

But then at other times an expectation is reasonable because society will back it.

Again, start from the nucleus of self-ownership.

I favour describing things as they are relative to my ideas rather than hypotheticals. YOur examples have been mixing the two, and you seem to have gotten confused.

The conflict disappears when you expand incrementally. What do we own now; what does that mean we can gain control of? I would bring up the rock thing again but I already did that one by reversing the situation back onto Calmy.

Aha, perhaps you should drop your conclusion from your assumptions.

No.

Trashing the commons is ok, got it.

No. The square isn't a commons. conflating current situations with hypotheticals again.

If you can walk somewhere public, then why can't I?

Conflation. You own yourself. You own, therefore, your ears. Therefore, if someone insists on trying to Baptise you after you've asked them to stop, then you can, according to their norms, kill them. Brutally, if you want. They do not respect self-ownership.

So, instead of going with the strict logical conclusion, I just say it's wrong; harassment.

According to the current situation, you 'agree' with your security agency not to kill people for minor offenses, partially because the court system is there to determine that wrongdoing was actually done, and because standardization of punishment leads to fewer violations of property rights.

The walking part of the equation is quite irrelevant.

If and evangelist is talking and I don't want to hear it, which of us has to leave?

See above.

What if we both want to stand in the nice area of the commons?

See above.

How does harassment extend from self-ownership?

Ah, sorry, I didn't realize it wasn't obvious. Sorry again.

Now I'm telling him where he can walk and talk based on what I want to hear?

See above.

As for what I think of your solutions, they are an endless series of patches. they just lead to other problems.

That seems to be because you don't understand them. Please note that this is not impugning your intellect; it is most likely because I'm doing a shit job of explaining myself.

And I don't think you ever really fixed the circular argument I first mentioned, as it keeps creeping back.

Yes, I know you think that. It appears from my perspective that your preconception of the argument as circular is blinding you to what I'm saying at points.

Again, please note that there are many reasons it may appear that way. This is why I use the word 'appears' in preference to any other.

I will be making shorter replies, as I want to focus more of my attention on the discussions at overcomingbias.com .

Something interesting going on over there?

Anyway, thanks for giving me the idea that all property regimes favor accelerating entropy.

Shrug. Think what you like.

James Andrix said...

Which means that the government expect to control littering in the 'commons.' Which means it's not commons, it's just owned by the government.

The government can outlaw arbitrary behaviors, does that mean they own everything and everyone?

And then they have to be able to reasonably expect to keep control of it the way you couldn't, which is a contradiction in normative logic.

But that is the only real way to stop me from throwing my rock/plutonium into the lake/ocean. It's not really helpful to try to extract restitution after the fact.


Note that I have no objection to laws against 'attempted murder.' Attempting murder is a crime even when they fail.

And attempted theft? and attempted evangelism without consent? and attempted rock throwing?

Note that his control dissipates when the ripples do.
Irrelevant. His expectation of control persists as long as there is a lake and he has rocks.

Calmy must attempt to supercede Splashy's control of the rock-in-hand.

Assume Calmy is effective in stealing the rock. He cannot then, through normative logic, object to Splashy forcefully regaining the rock and throwing it into the lake.

If Calmy uses force, he only accomplishes making his position morally indefensible.


Replace rock with plutonium. Explain.

And what if it's not deadly? what if someone just wants to release a horrible smell into the air. A harmless odor.

Usually, people (especially civilized people) are more interested in who should own something than in who can keep hold of it by force.
Perhaps, but you have to show that it is a violation of incremental expansion, and you have to be consistent.

In this case he's hurling a projectile.

I was trying to bring up a different image; tripping and stepping into the lake to regain his balance. Or, knocking a rock down the bank. In other words, contravening this supposed 'control' by accident, analogous to sneezing and finding a wallet in your hand. "Oops! I'm guilty of theft!" It doesn't make any sense.


Calmy is now exercising his control over the lake. Perhaps in the future he will take steps to keep people further away from it to prevent 'accidents'. Does the fact that he doesn't keep people so far away that they can't hurl a projectile mean they have the right to?

This:
Healthy societies prevent them from acting this out,
and this:
My model allows it if it is unowned.
..are interesting.

No one randomly burns forest when they could be making money instead.
People do and want weird things. people often make money to satisfy desires that have nothing to making more money. Like maybe some people want to buy film footage of forest fires, and maybe somebody wants to make that footage. If your system relies on people only wanting what you think they will, it will fail.

::What if it's a controlled burn?
Then it's not random.


I never said it had to be random. It's just one of a large number of non-reversible things someone might want to do. Maybe they just want to play with fire, maybe they are filming. The point is once they do what they want, your options to use the commons are diminished.

Yeah, they do. I don't see this as a problem, for reasons enumerated above.

This is a broader topic, I think. But:
Entropy is bad.
A system that rewards and protects agents that seek to maximize entropy is very VERY bad.

Except there will first be a race to exploit it usefully. The exploders will run out of money and the exploiters will become rich. Blowing things up to gain ownership of it is as unstable as life that sucks at surviving.

Pfft. Most of what we would want to exploit can easily survive explosions, and explosions can cover a large area. But maybe you're right, maybe it would be laser beams. The point is, if you get it by 'tagging' it, then there is a race to tag, not a race to use effectively. even by a more charitable interpretation, it is a race to reasonably secure, not a race to use.

That plus a smart security agency may simply refuse to secure property gained by explosions. It would not be as profitable as securing economically developed property.

Ok look. If you want to base this off of incremental expansion, then do it. Your principle either implies that people own something or it doesn't. Don't reach out to society to enforce control every time the individual can't achieve it they way you want, and then reach out again to circumvent that expectation whenever a person owns more than is practical. Otherwise the security agencies own everything.

You're really good at describing the status quo.
Yes and how would your system preserve my right to exist? Where do I get to sleep?

The conflict disappears when you expand incrementally. What do we own now; what does that mean we can gain control of? I would bring up the rock thing again but I already did that one by reversing the situation back onto Calmy.

Do I own my plutonium, or not? is society going to respect that, or not?

No. The square isn't a commons. conflating current situations with hypotheticals again.

Ok, splashy and calmy are in the wilderness. Splashy starts talking about jesus, Calmy tells him to shut up. Does he have to stop talking? or walk away?

The walking part of the equation is quite irrelevant.

Harassment is just an announcement right where you happen to be. Or do we also have to delve into intentionality?

But let me get this straight:
I can kill someone for making ripples in the air that I don't like, but I can't snatch a rock from the hand of someone who is making ripples in water?

Why does my self-ownership stop before it reaches my retina?
Why are the neurons that contain what I believe different from the neurons that contain what I see? or better: the neurons that contain my model of the outside world? How is making me believe there is a splash different than making me believe there is a god?

Yes, I know you think that. It appears from my perspective that your preconception of the argument as circular is blinding you to what I'm saying at points.

Ok:
Can I reasonably expect to control something I have in my hand?
Is it wrong to circumvent that?

Alrenous said...

The government can outlaw arbitrary behaviors, does that mean they own everything and everyone?

Yes.

More or less, anyway.

It's not really helpful to try to extract restitution after the fact.

We will have to agree to disagree. In my world, incentives work.

Replace rock with plutonium. Explain.

Already have. Assuming sea, which is unowned at the moment, and plutonium dumping, fact is that most people don't want that to happen. The security provider refuses to provide security to plutonium dumpers, and the dumpers run out of wealth with which to obtain plutonium to dump.

Since the dumpers are, by and large, not retarded, they realize this chain of events in advance and don't do it in the first place.

Alternatively, incentives work.

Calmy is now exercising his control over the lake.

His non-control? Yeah, he's excersing all of it.

Perhaps in the future he will take steps to keep people further away from it to prevent 'accidents'.

Except that he can't, because he doesn't control or even own the lake.

Does the fact that he doesn't keep people so far away that they can't hurl a projectile mean they have the right to?

And suddenly Calmy does own the lake. Does, assuming you have a pond in the backyard, the fact that it is in stone's throw of other people mean they have the right to do so?

People do and want weird things.

Oh, so we're talking about reality again. Well, guess what? The forests are owned, and random burning constitutes a crime both in my idealized system and in the real system.

options to use the commons are diminished.

I have hope that one day you'll realize that talking about 'the commons' to me is begging the question.

Entropy is bad.

Axiom.

The point is, if you get it by 'tagging' it, then there is a race to tag, not a race to use effectively.

Tagging does not effectively cement expectations of control. We can explode things on the moon right now, but there's no damn point.

even by a more charitable interpretation, it is a race to reasonably secure, not a race to use.

Since security is a necessary prerequisitite for most forms of ownership, this is true regardless.

It seems you object to, for instance, squatting-by-security. Yet, security requires investment and as such when the property is sold - the ultimate goal of the squatter - there is real value exchanged.

Otherwise the security agencies own everything.

Except in the case of banks, which can effectively control though monetary means, this is true. The security agencies do own everything, and you're one step closer to finding unqualified-reservations.blogspot.com to be useful instead of merely verbose.

Yes and how would your system preserve my right to exist? Where do I get to sleep?

Those are two separate questions. One is self-ownership and the other is already solved.

Does he have to stop talking? or walk away?

Stop talking.

I'm getting tired of repeating myself because my time is valuable. The broken record effect suggests that I'm wasting it.



Your other objections are noted, but I'm not at home and don't have the resources to answer them at the moment.

May also be because one serious debate at a time is enough for me.

Alrenous said...

Also, a full discussion on how you can turn ownership to create social goods is on unenumerated.blogspot.com. Though at the moment I can't be arsed to find it.

An internal search of 'magna carta' should lead you to the right link cluster.

Everything I would say is simply be a summary of things he's already said.

HackEdit: Or search 'juristopia'

Argh non-editing. Everything should use the reddit comment system.

Alrenous said...

Because Andrix seems intent on avoiding the point...

"The Baptists are violating your values. Tell them to piss off.

"The announcer may be violating your values, but you knew damn fine ('reasonably expected') to hear announcements in the fountain square. Your decision to go does not give you ownership of the square and so the owner's decision to allow announcements in the square stands.

"You own yourself. This is indisputable. Therefore, you have a right to live."

James Andrix said...

Well that's all well and good, but a right to live where? How do you reconcile my incremental right to the land under my feet with the right of all the landowners to kick me off their land? As I've asked and you have not answered: Where do I sleep? Going forward a bit more, what do I eat?

You assert that people can establish ownership of land by securing it, but when Calmy secures a portion of the lake, you ignore this.

You still jump between incremental rights from your principles and societally induced rights.
Again: what if no one owns the square.
What if the owner of the square allows 'harrasment'?
What if the owner expresses no opinion on 'harassment', but states that people can walk where they want in the square and say what they want in the square... can the baptists follow me and preach at me? How is this different from an unowned square?


You ignore that commons are in fact all around us, and a world without commons would be a horror.
In you model, a commons would be anything that you or I can both influence, and that influences both of us, and that neither can stop the other from influence without aggression.

This includes the electromagnetic spectrum and the audio spectrum and the atmosphere in general. If you stink, how shal I intervene? who owns the air? Do they own it by incremental principle? or is their ownership based on a contradiction?

Positing that no one will want to burn the wilderness is simply avoiding the issue. You must show that your model will bootstrap in an idealized unowned world containing a realistic range of humans. You've got to show what is owned incrementally, and you've got to show it won't break the moment someone wants something 'weird'.

I poke holes in your argument and you change your argument, but you won't lay it out again clearly, and you say I don't understand. Your biases are beyond my ability to argue.

Alrenous said...

Your biases are beyond my ability to argue.

No, your biases are such that I cannot argue.

Basically I've realized that you're bent on not accepting the theory. (Here for an example of what non-hostile questioning looks like.) Now, since you're a human being, you most certainly have the power to do that. But realizing this, your actions seem pretty much of the burning forest variety you so decry.

Or, notice that the perspective is symmetric. Since we cannot do experiments, how would you propose that we break the symmetry?

and you say I don't understand.

You're right I shouldn't say that. I have no idea whether you understand or not. I just know you're bent on not accepting it. At least I know why; because you're romatically attached to the commons for some reason. The idea that you might be able to get (whatever) with formal instead of informal ownership is a contradiction to you, and so for this and a few side reasons you see the mere existence of this idea to be threating to your interest in (whatever).


How do you reconcile my incremental right to the land under my feet with the right of all the landowners to kick me off their land?

You have no such right, but they already have that right. You apparently deal with it pretty effectively.

but states that people can walk where they want in the square and say what they want in the square

Violates self-ownership. As before, you cannot use expansions of self-ownership to violate self-ownership without hypocrisy. Again, I'm repeating myself.

You ignore that commons are in fact all around us, and a world without commons would be a horror.

False. Your imagination is getting away with you. While 1984 is very very close to reality, it's still fiction. Note we basically already have the three states; Russia, China, USA. we have wars (Georgia) and nuclear sabre rattling. (Poland, IIRC) So these states already have Orwellian levels of power, do rather Orwellian things, yet we do not have Orwellian levels of dystopia, and for good reasons.

All this to illustrate that we most certainly do not have commons. we have land, and some stretches of unowned sea. That's all. The owners of the land happen to allow commoners to use it, but this can change basically at whim. (That they don't usually choose to is one of the reason we don't have Orwellian levels of dystopia.)

In you model, a commons would be anything that you or I can both influence, and that influences both of us, and that neither can stop the other from influence without aggression.

This includes the electromagnetic spectrum

No.

the audio spectrum

No.

the atmosphere in general.

Maybe.

If you stink, how shal I intervene?

Violation of previously owned property.

Positing that no one will want to burn the wilderness is simply avoiding the issue.

False and that's not even the crux of my argument. My theory has a problem that will never come up. Oh no! My actual argument was that even if they did, they will run out of money with which to do so, while people who actually secure the place will not.

This immediately follows from the crux of your argument; that this system incentivizes unproductive behavior. It doesn't matter, because physics inherently disincentivizes unproductive behavior. If it's not actively subsidized, it's suicidal.

I poke holes in your argument and you change your argument,

Two possibilities. First, it appears to you that I change my argument. I refer to your beliefs about the relations to state power. Second, the correct term is 'improve.' I'm allowed to improve, aren't I?

but you won't lay it out again clearly,

I had planned to but I found that everything I've said to you was already in my original post. If you weren't bent on proving me wrong it's quite possible for you to have answered your own questions.

I found it impossible to create a post that wasn't simply a rehash of this one.



So basically you expect to control the state of my mind. Otherwise, you would not argue at all. similarly, if you did not expect to control all your possessions, you would never have bothered to acquire them in the first place. All this control is an extension of your self-control, as indeed it cannot be anything else.

More precisely, you expect to control the state of my blog's comment section. This expectation is reasonable; you own the posting process. (Hopefully you realize that while I do not own the content, I own the existence of the comment once submitted.)

How do you expect me to take objections to this idea seriously? You're using it to even get the objections across.


Your comment about biases would have more force if my predictions didn't keep coming true. A trivial example; I used my simple general knowledge about fruit flies to construct a trap. It worked. Turns out you do catch more with vinegar. Add a little rotting fruit for spice.

Less trivial; a post on I believe mindhack about how people see certain faces as more trustworthy. I recognized the trust-less face as high in testosterone; aggressive, in other words. A day later I found two references to a study showing that that exact kind of face is a marker for aggressiveness. The first theory is just a recognition that aggression is an antithesis to trustworthiness; someone should have come up with the hypothesis much faster.

I make similar but much less externally measurable predictions about people that keep coming true as well. For instance, I knew from your first post that you're the kind of person that says, "Your biases are beyond my ability to argue." I took you seriously as a courtesy, but the fact that I was unable to penetrate your armour is completely unsurprising to me. This is, of course and as I mentioned, unverifiable, but true nonetheless. As such I approached the debate mostly from an internal perspective - writing down my arguments forces me to know what I'm actually arguing. This prediction is also true - it was, as a result, profitable for me.

FTP: I am much more surprised that insults are so effective at drawing out further discussion. Similarly, judging from this instance among others, it appears that when I'm unsatisfied with a debater I should find the worst insults I can think of and hurl them without mercy. This appears to improve the quality of the discourse. Just goes to show that you should test any and every theory of behavior you're actually using.

James Andrix said...

You have no such right, but they already have that right.

So you assert I have the right to exist, just not in any, you know, place.

::but states that people can walk where they want in the square and say what they want in the square

Violates self-ownership. As before, you cannot use expansions of self-ownership to violate self-ownership without hypocrisy.


I almost think you misread me.

Are you saying that a land owner can't declare his land to be a place where people can walk and talk as they like, including following people? because this violates self ownership? but the land owner can kick people off the land? because this doesn't violate self ownership?



In you model, a commons would be anything that you or I can both influence, and that influences both of us, and that neither can stop the other from influence without aggression.


Are you saying commons is something else? What would you call things that fit this definition? where do the electromagnetic and audio spectra fall?

::If you stink, how shal I intervene?

Violation of previously owned property.


That's a noun phrase. If you mean stinky's (replacing 'you') stink is a violation, you still haven't answered my question, though I'm guessing you'd say violence would be justified. It presents other questions: why is something offensive to the nose different from something offensive to the eyes? Where can stinky exist?

If you mean intervention is a violation, then can a landowner remove stinky? If he stinks a lot how is this different in your model from the plutonium situation?

How do you expect me to take objections to this idea seriously? You're using it to even get the objections across.

This makes me think you don't understand your argument.
You're asserting much more than that people expect to control things and sometimes do. Defining that as owning and declaring that ownership morally protected are whole other issues.
It's silly to imply those are base assumptions in someone's mental model of posting.

You're right I shouldn't say that. I have no idea whether you understand or not. I just know you're bent on not accepting it. At least I know why;

Ah, so you don't know THAT about my mind, but you know these other two things.

you're romatically attached to the commons for some reason. The idea that you might be able to get (whatever) with formal instead of informal ownership is a contradiction to you, and so for this and a few side reasons you see the mere existence of this idea to be threating to your interest in (whatever).

I'm romantically attached to the right to exist. You still haven't told me where I could sleep if not the commons. I can conceive of a formal model of ownership that includes a commons, or a right to exist, or both, formality is fine.
I knew this system was broken well before any discussion of commons came up, and before I had even an inkling of the entropy problem. Looking back on my first post, I see the start of the circularity, and I predict patches, but I had no way to know the way things would go.

You need to seriously consider This .

Alrenous said...

See? Hurl insults, argument gets better. I really wish I knew what was going on here. Do please realize I have correlation but can only speculate at causation.

So you assert I have the right to exist, just not in any, you know, place.

Let me quote myself.

You apparently deal with it pretty effectively.

Wait, wasn't that sentence immediately after the one you quoted?


Are you saying that a land owner can't declare his land to be a place where people can walk and talk as they like, including following people? because this violates self ownership? but the land owner can kick people off the land? because this doesn't violate self ownership?

Yes.

For you to not agree to be kicked off their land violates extended self-ownership. It helps that you know this in advance when you step onto the land, as you expect the same right on your own. You can't then reasonably complain if they invoke the right. Unless the landowner has some contract, which you agree to, explicitly revoking your right to control how you are treated, harassment is harassment.

Note that the landowner has a negative right - the right to have you not on the land. The landowner has no positive rights - they cannot force you to do anything new when you're on the land. Even if you agree to it in exchange for access, their only recourse if you do not continue to agree is to make you leave.

You need to turn the 'sophistication' dial on your brain up a couple notches. You're having a lot of difficulty parsing the actual consequences of what I'm saying here, as indeed you usually do. (Hypothesis; I can maintain the insulted-version Andrix by maintaining the average insults per time, rather than in insult bursts. Test; mild insult. Result? To be determined.)


I don't accept that there is any such thing as a commons except for sake of argument. Stuff is owned, or unowned, which for most modern property corresponds to secured and unsecured.


It's silly to imply those are base assumptions in someone's mental model of posting.

It's a good thing I'm not talking about a mental model then.

To be logically consistent, you cannot state that "reasonable expectation of control" is not morally protected. This is not obvious, which is why I wrote a post about it.

The only way to even pretend to do it is to declare that my reasonable expectations are invalid, but yours are valid, a stance which is not logically justifiable.

You still haven't told me where I could sleep if not the commons.

You described your exact situation, under my theory, and I suggested that you seem to have found a way to make it work. I was suggesting that maybe you could, I don't know, agree to pay rent in exchange for not being thrown off the land.

But, reviewing your actual objections, apparently this isn't good enough. You want to exist for free.

First, try not paying taxes, and tell me how well that works out for you under the current system.

Mine at least gives you the opportunity to buy your own land. (It outlaws taxes pretty much immediately.) It is a fact that land is a resource that requires resources to maintain. You can never get existence for free.

I dunno, what else do I need to refute? It's inevitable that all the land will be owned by somebody. You can make a pseudo-commons at any time if you own the land.

Even in pre-civilization, you had to earn your keep to stay in the tribe. My system does not outlaw letting people mooch, but no system ever forces you to let moochers stay.

Additional comments along that nature.

Ah, so you don't know THAT about my mind, but you know these other two things.

The blog is called Accepting Ignorance. I don't pretend to knowledge I don't have as much as possible.

You still haven't told me where I could sleep if not the commons.

::My existence is contingent on having land to exist on, and that is contingent on getting permission from some landowner. Usually through payment.

You really need to make your objections consistent. The first statement is saying that my theory doesn't allow you to sleep anywhere, since I don't believe in commons. The second is just bitching about money like a socialist.

Your definition of 'right to exist' seems to shift between having a free place and not being shot at randomly. You're either being dishonest or very sloppy. Either way I have to do a lot of work to fix it. I wouldn't even mind doing it if it weren't such a waste of my time, as noted previously.

I can conceive of a formal model of ownership that includes a commons, or a right to exist, or both, formality is fine.

That seems to have been spliced from two sentences. You said earlier that

If I did want to show property rights directly with logic, I would probably posit a right to exist.

I haven't developed any good theory that shows they don't exist or are very limited.


So you don't have an actual formal model yourself, so, in the spirit of Phoenix Wright, "Objection!"

Whatever you're using to justify the commons or your 'right to exist' is not formal. That is just a fact.

I knew this system was broken well before any discussion of commons came up

::But no, I think you're right, and that's the problem. I may have to refine this, but:

Your theory of property gives preferential influence of any commons to whoever wants to increase entropy the fastest.


Again, consistency, Andrix. Pick one and stick with it - or at least notify me of changes. (While I don't accept the commons and I think I can prove the entropy thing isn't a problem, this is still a statement of capitulation.) If you can't even do that I shouldn't even ask, but...that statement is clearly a turning point from skepticism to acceptance. Do not write these if that's not what you mean.

You need to seriously consider this

Summarize. He's talking about AI and I really don't care, since it ("the amazingly simple utility function that is all you need to program into an artificial superintelligence and then everything will turn out fine.") doesn't apply.

Also, no. Just no.

You really need to consider having respect for people you disagree with. I at least pretend.


Just for shits and giggle, why not?

Because I'm not King, nor the New York Times. My theories don't matter; you could just Accept my Ignorance and get on with your life. Because you obviously have only contempt for me, so what kind of sicko would advise that I try to please you? Because if Yudkowsky wasn't full of shit I'd already be reading his stuff. Because if I needed to 'overcome bias' my predictions would be turning out incorrect. Because this one is much more interesting, because I did overcome it. I became very good at knowing how long I'd spend on assignments. And yes, it did involve many corrections on top of my natural estimate system, in fact using basically the same solution Yudkowsky had to go to science for. Now it's baked in and I can't look at something without knowing to within about ten minutes how long it will take. This is not a situation of confirmation bias, which I also overcame. (This could still be a case of self-fulfilling prophecy, but if so I have absolutely ridiculous control over everything.) Oh, and because I can't get a coherent picture out of you.

You should have linked an article about affective death spirals. I remember that article having some meat to it, and it's clearly relevant. Not that Yudkowsky doesn't have some howlers even in those ones. Mostly, though, that one only confirms what I already do. In fact it gives me words for something that I didn't have words for before; always consider the claims, for good or evil, specifically. Work through the chain of causality, never justify something by association.

Put that way, it seems awfully obvious. But if you went to Rust Belt Philosophy, I bet at least a third of the things on there violates this edict. Everything on Reddit does. Dawkins and PZ would get gibbed by it.


I would have been more impressed if you attacked an actual weakness of my argument, such as;

"Defining ownership as reasonable expectation of control leaves out several forms of what we now call ownership, and as such this definition is clearly invalid."

And of course actually come up with examples. I only recently realized that I hadn't even laid this out...but that's partly because I only recently formalized the definition procedure, so that I knew what I was actually doing.

James Andrix said...

You apparently deal with it pretty effectively.

You seem confused about whether your system describes our current situation, or anarcho-capitalist morality.

I live somewhere, I but I do not live under your system.

Wait, wasn't that sentence immediately after the one you quoted?

For the above reason, and another I'll talk about shortly, it was irrelevant to my quest for a place to sleep in your system.

Yes.
Woot.

I find it interesting that by your description, even the land owner can't follow people around without their consent on his own land.

For you to not agree to be kicked off their land violates extended self-ownership.

This implies that there must be explicit or implicit consent for someone to be legitimately assaulted.

It helps that you know this in advance when you step onto the land, as you expect the same right on your own.

You have not shown that. Calmy was unable to claim land by securing it, why should I expect that right? Does that right come from circular reasoning? or the state?

To be logically consistent, you cannot state that "reasonable expectation of control" is not morally protected.
Of course you can! watch:

P1: "Reasonable expectation of control" is not morally protected.

Now what else are you going to say must be in my mental model to contradict it?

The only way to even pretend to do it is to declare that my reasonable expectations are invalid, but yours are valid, a stance which is not logically justifiable.
'valid'? as in moral? or logical? or are you saying not what's 'really' in your head again?
But no, I don't need any of that for P1.

But, reviewing your actual objections, apparently this isn't good enough. You want to exist for free.
How naive of me, a right you don't have to pay for!
But this is not quite correct, I want to exist without asking permission.
I admit I never defined 'right' but I thought it was commonly understood that rights aren't something you have to ask for in a way that can be denied.

You've made it clear now that under your system, non land owners must get permission from someone to exist. Your system does not have that as a right.

First, try not paying taxes, and tell me how well that works out for you under the current system.

You're confused again. Does your system describe current system of ownership?
I never said the current system contained a right to exist.

Mine at least gives you the opportunity to buy your own land. (It outlaws taxes pretty much immediately.)

Ha! No. It doesn't. Because you've already said the state owns everything, and you have to go to state enforcement every time your 'reasonable expectation' is circumvented because you didn't really bother to secure your items because the state will do it for you. If ownership is ultimately determined by the overarching force-systems that enforce ownership, then (tautology-watch) they determine ownership. Which means only they really have a reasonable expectation of control, and they can take that land if you don't pay your taxes.

It is a fact that land is a resource that requires resources to maintain.

I've never seen land vanish due to lack of maintenance. Maybe at bodies of water, but in bulk, it's just there'
Buildings and roads might deteriorate, but that's really secondary.

You can never get existence for free.

Yes, interestingly due to increasing entropy. Odd, that.

My system does not outlaw letting people mooch, but no system ever forces you to let moochers stay.

Moochers? Again you assume people need permission to exist. You seem to think that a person's mere existence is costing others something that they are entitled to. In a way that the person who is merely existing is not entitled to. Smells like contradiction.

Your definition of 'right to exist' seems to shift between having a free place and not being shot at randomly.
If all the land is owned, and I don't obtain permission, then I will be shot at by whoever owns the land I happen to be on. (assuming I can't survive by trespassing on poorly guarded land.)
Also, I don't think a commons surrounded by owned land (or even common roads through it) is my preference for preserving the right to exist. It might work as a last ditch patch for preserving it in your system. (but again, there would need to be some way of making the commons not become 'owned'.)

So you don't have an actual formal model yourself, so, in the spirit of Phoenix Wright, "Objection!"

Your point being? I've been pretty upfront that I'm dismantling this because it's severely broken.

Whatever you're using to justify the commons or your 'right to exist' is not formal. That is just a fact.

I'm not using _anything_ to 'justify' them.

I stated that a right to exist would be axiomatic, if I were trying to create a property system. In order to avoid the inhumanities we see in your system.

and Commons? It's a word, it means things. What does it mean?

Again, consistency, Andrix. Pick one and stick with it

If you'll read more carefully, you'll see that 'I think you're right' was in reference to calmy's desire being more expensive than splashy's desire.

I knew the system was broken at my first post, I don't think we discussed the commons until slpashy vs. calmy.

(While I don't accept the commons

Wait, what?
I understand that all land is owned, and would remain or quickly become owned under your system.
But the commons is a word, it means something. I gave a definition of the commons, but you weren't clear on if you accepted that definition.
Either way, things that I think fit that definition do exist, and I think would remain unowned in your system. (unless you use a state or pseudostate)
You haven't explained how those things would be kept from being completely unusable.

ALSO: You have no way for anything to ever become legitimately owned. Rocks maybe, land no. If you can't bootstrap it from a commons without a state, then you can't bootstrap. How does somebody secure land without infringing on prior property?

You should have linked an article about affective death spirals.

I did. That was it. I find it interesting that you didn't read it.

Specifically, It's about the part of a death spiral where you hook out to something other than your principle when you're thinking about it's consequences. (such as your human sense of morality when predicting what an AI driven by your principle will do.)

In your case, you either hook out explicitly to the police (when you want to show that your system lead to ownership of the things we currently own) or implicitly to your own sense of anarcho-capitalist morality (when you want to say taxes are wrong,)

In the latter case you invent an explanation, but do so inconsistently. So we can mandate the movement/words of other people in a public place, but we can't control 'the view'.

Do you really think that all ownership rules compress into three words? No. Of course those words describe what we now call ownership as long as you let the state decide what's reasonable. Of course they describe anarcho-capitalism as long as you pick and choose where you extend ownership first.

Now you'll either say I am not getting it, or that I'm making great arguments because you insulted me before.

Due to time constraints I'll not be responding to the other threads for a while.